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I. Introduction
Early to bed and early to rise, makes a man healthy, wealthy, and wise. A stitch in
time saves nine. ~ Benjamin Franklin

i. March 29th, 1937
On Monday, March 29th, 1937, fifty three thousand people gathered on the
South Lawn of the White House. However, despite continued economic uncertainty
highlighted by talks of an imminent recession, these people did not gather for a
strike, demonstration or protest. Rather, they came for the annual Easter Egg Roll
celebration hosted by President Roosevelt.1
The mood at the Supreme Court could not have been any different than the
mood at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. When Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes
greeted a courtroom filled with roughly 4,000 attendees, tension filled the room.
The Court, after all, had been the greatest obstacle to Roosevelt’s New Deal since its
inception, and onlookers were anxious to see if this would continue.
As Hughes proceeded to announce the outcome of five cases from the
previous term, one case, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, was of particular interest.
Here, the defendants argued that the minimum wage law in the State of
Washington—which mandated that women be paid a minimum of 30 cents per
hour—was unconstitutional.
Those arguing that the law was unconstitutional had recent Supreme Court
precedents in their favor. In 1923, the Court in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital ruled
1

Shesol, Jeff, Supreme Power, W.W. Norton & Company 2010, pg. 403
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that federal minimum wage laws were unconstitutional pursuant to an implied
“liberty of contract.” As the Justice Sutherland wrote in the majority opinion, “liberty
of contract” could be understood as the right of a twenty one-year old elevator
operator and her boss to negotiate with “equal rights to obtain […] the best terms
they can.”2 This right to contract was found, for “Sutherland and other court
conservatives,” in “the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,” which
“protected private contracts from federal economic [regulatory] legislation.”3
The Adkins affirmation of a “liberty of contract” was further validated less
than one year prior to Parrish in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo (1936). In
Morehead, the Court ruled by a 5-4 margin that a New York minimum wage law,
similar to the Washington D.C. statute at question in Adkins, was unconstitutional.
Furthermore, in the majority opinion penned by Justice Butler, the Adkins principle
was declared “sound” and it was stated, “The Adkins case controls.” “Freedom of
contract,” Butler wrote, “is the general rule and restraint is the exception.”4
Thus, when the Parrish decision was announced on March 29th, few surmised
that the Court would uphold the State of Washington’s minimum wage law.
However, that is exactly what the Court decided in a 5-4 ruling. As Burt Solomon put
it in his account of the turbulent period, “the reversal was blunt, and
unembarrassed, and a shock.”5
The “reversal,” was due to the vote of one judge, Associate Justice Owen
Roberts. In the Morehead case, Roberts had voted with the 5-4 majority to uphold
Ibid. pg. 219
Simon, James F., FDR and Chief Justice Hughes, Simon & Schuster 2012, pg. 182
4 Butler, Pierce, Morehead v. People of State of New York 298 U.S. 587, 1936
5 Solomon, Burt, FDR v. The Constitution. Walker & Company 2009, pg. 158
2
3
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the Adkins precedent and strike down the minimum wage law. Nine months later, in
Parrish, Justice Roberts had again voted with the majority, but this time to affirm the
law and reverse the Adkins precedent. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the majority
in Parrish, asked of the so-called liberty of contract:” “What is this freedom? The
constitution does not speak of freedom of contract [….] freedom of contract is a
qualified, and not an absolute, right.”6
The day that Parrish was announced soon became known as “White Monday,”
which counteracted 1935’s “Black Monday.” Black Monday referred to May 27th,
1935, when the Supreme Court ruled that the National Industrial Recovery Act
(“NIRA”) and Frazier-Lemke Act —key pieces of President Roosevelt’s “New Deal”
initiative—were unconstitutional.7 This ruling was the latest in a series of rebuffs
that the Supreme Court leveled at the New Deal, having previously struck down the
Federal Farm Bankruptcy Act and the Railroad Act. In the next year, the Court ruled
the Coal Conservation Act and Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional as well.
Three of these five laws were struck down by 6-3 or 5-4 margins. The other two
decisions were unanimous. In each case, Justice Roberts had voted with the
conservative majority. The Supreme Court had “made mincemeat of the Roosevelt
New Deal.”8
The Parrish decision marked a turning point. Only weeks after Parrish, Justice
Roberts voted in favor of the Social Security Act in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis and
affirmed the constitutionality of the Wagner Act in National Labor Relations Board v.

Hughes, Charles, West Coast Hotel v. Parrish 300 U.S. 379, 1937
Shesol, Supreme Power, pgs. 127-130
8 Ball, Howard. Hugo L. Black: Cold Steel Warrior. Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 90
6
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Jones & Laughlin Steel. Roberts was the deciding vote in each: Davis and Laughlin
were both 5-4 rulings.
With the death or retirement of five Supreme Court justices in the two-year
span thereafter, President Roosevelt was able to solidify the Court as primarily proNew Deal, appointing allies such as longtime confidant Felix Frankfurter and
Solicitor General Stanley Reed to the bench.
Oddly, for such an important moment in history, Justice Roberts’s vote switch
from Morehead to Parrish has no consensus that explains its occurrence. There are
those who insist that President Roosevelt’s proposed Judicial Reorganization Bill of
1937 (colloquially known as the “court packing” plan) forced Justice Roberts’s hand.
Others say the election of 1936—which saw Roosevelt reelected in a landslide—
influenced Justice Roberts to change his opinion. Still, others argue that these
outside factors had no such bearing on Roberts; rather, his vote in Parrish was not
surprising and could have been anticipated.
This paper seeks to provide a contemporary analysis of this watershed
moment in American politics and draw us closer to understanding the great
conundrum: Why did Justice Roberts switch his vote?

ii. Research Design
a. Context
Following this Introduction, Part II of this research provides important
contextual information, including the biography and perception of Justice Roberts.
This section includes an analysis of a prior “vote switch” by Justice Roberts

8
overlooked in previous studies. Taken together, this section details Roberts’s
upbringing, ideology and jurisprudence.

b. Question One: Did a Predictable Switch Occur?
Part III addresses the first of two necessary questions in uncovering the
reasons underlying the Parrish vote. Was Justice Roberts’s vote in Parrish sudden
and unpredictable? Or was the vote in Parrish more predictable; could it have been
anticipated?
The Parrish outcome has aroused scholastic debate and interest since it was
announced in 1937. In the Morehead case, the majority wrote that the Adkins
precedent was “sound.” In the Parrish opinion nine months later, the majority
declared that the Adkins principle “should be, and is, overruled.”9 By virtue of
signing onto each majority opinion, and by refusing to clarify his jurisprudence in
concurring opinions, the nickname a “switch in time saves nine” soon debuted to
explain Roberts’s vote.10
However, it is not completely clear that Justice Roberts’s vote switch was as
unpredictable as it may appear. Since the mid 1990’s, many scholars—most notably
Barry Cushman—have argued that Parrish should have been expected, and was
simply a result of Roberts’s evolving jurisprudence.
This question is important in several regards. It is generally assumed that
Justice Roberts had a sudden, unpredictable switch from Morehead to Parrish, best
epitomized by the continued use of the “switch in time” phrase. However, this
9

Solomon, FDR v. The Constitution, pg. 158
Ibid. pg. 162.
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debased assumption confines the realm of possibilities and leads to an unproven
conclusion; there had to be an impetus, or ulterior motive, behind this “sudden”
shift. However, if Parrish was predictable, then this naturally alters the conclusion
behind the “switch” itself and lessens the likelihood of an exterior motive. In this
scenario, a more technical parsing—such as differences in the wording of the laws in
Morehead and Parrish—could explain the supposed discrepancy.
Felix Frankfurter, a close advisor to President Roosevelt, best summarized
these competing notions. In a letter to Roosevelt after the Parrish decision had been
rendered, Frankfurter called Roberts’s vote switch “irreconcilable.”11 However, in
1955, Frankfurter recanted that assertion and called the alleged vote switch a
“ludicrous illustration” of which “this false charge against Justice Roberts must be
dissipated.”12
To gauge the predictability of Parrish, it follows that a close study of the cases
preceding it must be examined. Dissecting cases before Parrish allows one to
develop a trend by which Roberts’s vote in Parrish can be accurately understood.
One such study focuses on mathematical modeling of Supreme Court
decisions per voting bloc. The goal of such modeling, as employed by Daniel Ho and
Kevin Quinn in a recent study of Roberts’s voting history, is to detect sudden
changes in voting patterns. This style of quantitative insight is similar in nature to

Ho, Daniel & Quinn, Kevin, “Did a Switch in Time Save Nine?” CELS 2009 4th Annual
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper 2009, pg. 3
12 Frankfurter, Felix, “Mr. Justice Roberts,” The University of Pennsylvania Law Review. Vol. 104
No. 3, December 1955, p. 313
11
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what credit companies use to detect credit card fraud—identifying sudden breaks in
purchasing patterns. 13
However, this method has certain limitations. Primarily, such modeling does
not discriminate amongst cases by category or issue. The substantive addition I
make to the existing statistical data surveying Justice Roberts is in this qualitative
realm. By gathering the totality of Justice Roberts’s votes in Supreme Court cases
from 1930-1937, the research herein analyzes an original dataset that is narrowed
by relevancy to Parrish. Essentially, the dataset seeks to rectify the major flaw in the
Ho & Quinn model, which is that it does not distinguish between case issue and
category. This original dataset allows for the closest possible look at cases that are
most similar to Parrish in topic and vote-margin.

c. Question Two: Why Did the “Switch in Time” Occur?
Part IV builds off of Part III and examines why Roberts voted the way he did
in Parrish. The first question, focusing on predictability of Parrish, is designed to
give this second research question context and a spectrum of possible explanations.
For example, finding that an unpredictable switch on Roberts’s behalf occurred in
the Parrish case presents a range of possibilities for why he underwent an
unpredictable shift. Conversely, concluding that Roberts’s vote in Parrish was very
much predictable confers a differing range of possible conclusions to this second
question.

13
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Uncovering why the switch occurred focuses mainly on a trio of qualitative,
historical, and primary sources. There is a bevy of academic literature that seeks to
answer—or at least provide a measure of clarity—to this question. This paper uses
these academic and scholarly foundations to reach novel conclusions, specifically
concerning individual actors, institutions, and dynamics of the time period.
However, the approach to this second question is limited to scholarly works
spanning the two divides, which have been dubbed the “Internal” and “External”
camps. These resources provide a good foundation for research, yet they do not tell
the entire story. As a result, primary research focuses on qualitative historical
relationships between individuals and within institutions. These include, but are not
limited to, roles played by President Roosevelt, Chief Justice Hughes, Felix
Frankfurter, and Justice Roberts in the occurrence of the vote switch. Institutionally,
research focuses on the Supreme Court, the Republican Party and the American
Liberty League, exclusively and as interacting dynamos.
Primary sources are of great value in this research. Newspaper and press
releases that have been gathered reveal specific intentions and perceptions of the
aforementioned actors and institutions. Published correspondence between
President Roosevelt and Felix Frankfurter as well as the published memos of Chief
Justice Hughes and Justices Roberts (although the latter destroyed almost the
entirety of his manuscripts and papers) allow this research to dig deeper into the
inner machinations of the men themselves.

12
d. Overview of Results
Part V discusses results, findings, and conclusions. This research advocates
for two underpinnings of the “switch in time.” First, the original dataset compiled (in
addressing Question One) verifies that a switch of both the unanticipated and
unpredictable variety did occur in 1937. Secondly, the dataset also indicates that a
pronounced change in Roberts’s jurisprudence occurred in the latter half of the
1934 term and persisted until the Parrish vote. These years indicate a conservative
shift, which made Roberts’s pro-labor rights vote in Parrish so surprising in the first
place.
Thus, there is a need to explain not only Justice Roberts’s vote in Parrish, but
also the conservative trend that he developed in the years prior; it was a trend that
deviated starkly from a more liberal jurisprudence that he displayed from 19301933. This paper, by incorporating previous findings with original research, is the
first one of its kind to advance the notion (as a primary argument) that much of
Justice Owen Roberts’s “somersault”14 stance on New Deal issues was due to the fact
that Roberts deeply entertained the notion of running for President on the
Republican ticket against President Roosevelt in 1936.
There is ample, original evidence to support such an assertion. Roberts was
not only consistently mentioned among the national press as a viable candidate, but
Kalman, Laura, “The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal” The American
Historical Review Vol. 110 No. 4, 2005, Par. 1
14

13
was sought after by the American Liberty League, an avidly anti-New Deal “proconstitution” organization that led the charge against FDR from 1934-1936. Roberts
openly advocated for the same fundamental position on issues as the Liberty
League, and maintained a host of close and personal connections to some of the
most important political leaders and financiers of the group. It seems clear that
Justice Owen Roberts was in many ways guided by a desire to seek the Presidency, a
fact that explains not only the Parrish vote, but also, quite importantly, the
conservative trend that preceded it. The Parrish vote, by extension, was the vote of a
Justice who had been ridiculed—even by those in his own party— for his Morehead
stance; it was also the vote of a Justice who recognized that public opinion had
crystallized against him after Roosevelt won reelection in November of 1936 by
historical proportions.

14

II. Background & Jurisprudence
“

But can I be a lawyer and be honest?” The headmaster stood and put his hands on his

student’s shoulder. “Owen, you can be honest at anything.”15

i. The Background and Biography of Owen Roberts
A study of Roberts’s vote in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish cannot be confined to
merely examining votes, compiling patterns, or trolling through accounts of the
turbulent period. The essence of individuality carries with it the implicit knowledge
that one’s unique background and experience affects one’s decision-making. Thus, a
survey into the background of Justice Owen Roberts is necessary for contextual
purposes.
a. Rise to Supreme Court Justice
Owen Josephus Roberts was born to a fairly well to do family in Germantown,
Pennsylvania, a suburb of Philadelphia, on May 2nd, 1875. His father, Josephus
Roberts, was the son of Welsh immigrants and made a living initially as a wagon
maker, before co-owning a wholesale hardware business in Philadelphia. He also
dabbled in politics, spending two terms on the Philadelphia Common Council as a
Republican. His success allowed him to send Owen to the Germantown Academy, an
elite prep school, and then the University of Pennsylvania at the age of sixteen.16

15
16
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After succeeding at the University of Pennsylvania, in both academics
(selected to Phi Beta Kappa, the exclusive social science honors society) and extracurricular activities (editor-in-chief of the student newspaper, and the chairman of
the yearbook committee) Roberts followed up on a burgeoning interest in law by
enrolling in the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Roberts's career began its ascent while studying law at the University of
Pennsylvania. He became part of the “University crowd, ” a group whose members
“dominated the politics and economics of Pennsylvania.”17 He also began a
relationship with George Wharton Pepper, a corporate and insurance law professor
at Penn Law. Wharton Pepper would later become a United States Senator, and is
credited with introducing Roberts to President Coolidge, which provided his first
foray into politics.18
After graduating from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in 1898,
Roberts began his career as an assistant prosecutor for the District Attorney of
Philadelphia. Upon leaving public service in 1904, Roberts became a lawyer for
Philadelphia Rapid Transit, a powerful Philadelphia streetcar corporation. In 1912,
he began a private practice with two others, and he represented a variety of
corporate clients, including Pennsylvania Railroad, Bell Telephone of Pennsylvania,
Drexel & Company and the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce.19
Roberts first became involved in national politics in 1924 at age 39, at the
outbreak of the “Teapot Dome” scandal. At the recommendation of his mentor
Geldreich, Gill Robert, "Justice Owen Roberts's Revolution of 1937" (1997). University of
Tennessee Honors Thesis Projects. http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_chanhonoproj/216 pg. 5
18 Leonard, Charles, A Search For a Judicial Philosophy, Kennikat Press 1971, pgs. 8-9
19 Solomon, FDR v. The Constitution pg. 56
17

16
Wharton Pepper, who by then had been elected a U.S. Senator, Roberts was
appointed as a special federal prosecutor in co-charge of investigating the alleged
malfeasance. Roberts’s name was seconded by Harlan Stone Fisk, a close friend of
President Coolidge, and by Charles Evans Hughes, Coolidge’s secretary of state.
Roberts’s “plain-spoken manner” was said to appeal to Coolidge, who sought to pair
a Republican with a Democrat in charge of the investigation. There was initial
concern amongst some Senators that Roberts was too friendly towards corporations
and thus would not be impartial in the Teapot Dome investigation. In a 1923
conference for bankers in New York, Roberts advocated for “old-fashioned AngloSaxon individualism,” defended $100,000 compensation for Standard Oil executives,
and chided “noisy minorities” for “running to the legislators every year for
government and state regulations of all sorts of businesses.”20 Although the Senate
debated Roberts’s nomination, he was eventually confirmed with only 8 dissenting
votes.21
Roberts found success as a federal investigator; as Literary Digest wrote,
“fame struck Owen J. Roberts with the swiftness of lightning.”22 The secretary of the
interior, Albert B. Fall, had been convicted of accepting a six-figure bribe, and
Roberts was dubbed “Sherlock Holmes” by the press.23
When Supreme Court Associate Justice Edward Sanford suddenly died in
March of 1930, President Hoover selected 4th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge John J.
Parker as Sanford’s replacement.
Ibid. pg. 57
Ibid. pgs. 58-59
22 Ibid. pg. 58
23 Ibid. pg. 59

20
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However, Parker’s nomination erupted a controversy. The NAACP alleged
that Parker had made a statement in 1920 “against the advancement of that race in
politics,” and organized labor vehemently opposed Parker due to an anti-union
ruling he made in 1927. Parker was subsequently rejected by the Senate. Two days
thereafter, Hoover submitted Roberts’s name to the Senate as a Supreme Court
nominee. Hoover desired a quick confirmation, and some speculated that Roberts’s
ideology would not be as easy to pin down as Parker’s was.24
At the time, Roberts's political leanings and judicial philosophy were of great
mystery to the press and political punditry. While the magazine Outlook surmised
that Roberts would “not infrequently, side with Holmes, Stone and Brandeis” (the
Court’s liberal bloc), the New York Herald-Tribune called Roberts a “metropolitan
corporation lawyer,” and “as conservative as Justice Parker.”25 There was also a
contingent of the media that declared Roberts’s philosophy a wild card. As the
Baltimore Sun editorialized, “Neither the liberals nor conservatives can be
absolutely certain in which direction his mind will move.”26
Roberts was widely acclaimed for his many years of public service, as both a
prosecutor in Philadelphia and as the special prosecutor during the Teapot Dome
scandal. As the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin wrote, “Mr. Roberts’s whole life in his
contact with public affairs […] has shown him to be a liberal in the true sense, a
progressive, forward-minded […]”27

Fish, Peter G., “Perspectives on the Selection of Federal Judges,” Kentucky Law Journal Vol. 77,
1988-1989, pg. 20
25 Leonard A Search For a Judicial Philosophy pg. 10-11
26 Ibid. pg. 11
27 Ibid. pg. 12
24
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On May 19th, 1930, ten days after sending Owen Roberts’s name to the Senate
for confirmation as a Supreme Court Associate Justice, the Senate confirmed his
nomination in less than one minute.28
Thus, Roberts began a career on the Supreme Court. He had been a lawyer
his entire life, and had no judicial experience whatsoever before being confirmed to
the Court.
b. Roberts’s Outlook and Jurisprudence
Those closest with Roberts paint a portrait of a man who was anything but
ideological in his approach to the law. Upon Roberts’s passing in 1955, Erwin
Griswold, who knew Roberts’s since the 1920’s, remarked that Roberts’s “approach
to […] problems” was that “he dealt with them as a lawyer. He was not a
philosopher, and he did not attempt to be. He was not a sociologist.”29
Perhaps more interesting is Griswold’s assertion that Roberts was “rarely
provocative, and never offensive. He was a lawyer […] not a crusader.”30 This
sentiment was echoed by Roberts’s mentor, George Wharton Pepper, who wrote
upon Roberts’s passing that “his beliefs were not of a complicated sort.” Wharton
Pepper also levied a warning to detractors of Roberts, saying that “It is not wise for
an outsider to speculate about the independence of [Roberts’s] thought” during his
Supreme Court tenure.31 It was a subtle allusion to the many whom believed that
Roberts’s vote in Parrish was irreconcilable and explainable only on the grounds
Ibid. pg. 13
Griswold, “Owen J. Roberts as a Judge” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 104, No. 3
(Dec., 1955), 336
30 Ibid. pg. 337
31 Wharton Pepper, George, “Owen J. Roberts- The Man,” The University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, Vol. 104 No. 3, December 1955, pg. 374
28
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that there was an ulterior motive at play. Other close friends have supported this
description of Roberts. John Lord O’Brien, who knew Roberts for many years,
asserted that Roberts always took a “pragmatic, rather than a theoretical approach
to legal questions.”32
However, this rosy portrait of Roberts should be viewed with some
skepticism for several reasons. First, of course, is the context of Griswold and
Wharton Pepper’s musings. They were both written and published in memoriam
very soon after Roberts’s passing; they were also published in the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, which was published, of course, by Roberts’s alma mater.
Secondly, there is an alternative view of Roberts that is not nearly as kind.
Upon Roberts’s retirement from the Supreme Court in 1945, then Chief Justice Stone
circulated a letter amongst his colleagues that commended Roberts on his work and
service to the nation. Although typically a formality, Justice Black took great issue
with the letter, especially its final line; “You have made fidelity to principle your
guiding decision.” Black said he could not “subscribe to such a loose interpretation”
of Roberts’s jurisprudence, specifically how “from 1933 to 1937, he seesawed on
critical economic New Deal cases.”33 In the end, Black so steadfastly refused to sign
the letter with this line intact that no letter was sent at all.34

Leonard, A Search For a Judicial Philosophy pg. 12
Ball, Howard, Hugo L. Black: Cold Steel Warrior pg. 13
34 Ibid. pg. 15
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Griswold did not see a “seesawed” jurisprudence. As he wrote, Roberts
“thought precedents and continuity were important, and he did not depart from
them in any bursts of emotional enthusiasm. “35

ii. Prior “Vote switch”
Being a Supreme Court justice is no small task. Over the course of his fifteenyear tenure on the nation’s highest bench, Roberts penned an opinion in 353 cases;
over 80% of those opinions were written for the majority. 36
A close look into this voting record reveals several startling discrepancies
that cannot easily be resolved. In fact, on the topic of estate tax law, it is not
unreasonable to say that Justice Owen Roberts had a “switch” very similar to the
famous vote in Parrish.
A cursory glance at Justice Roberts voting record on federal estate tax issues
reveals a judge who, time and time again, voted against the federal government. In
the 1935 watershed St. Louis Trust Cases (Becker v. St Louis Trust & Helvering v. St.
Louis Trust), the Court was asked to decide whether a certain type of trust could be
considered a “transfer” of wealth (and immune from estate taxes), or if such a trust
was merely a guise for avoiding these sort of taxes. The Supreme Court, by a 5-4
margin, voted against the government. Roberts, along with the conservative “four
horsemen”37 made up the majority.

Griswold, “Owen J. Roberts as a Judge” pg. 336
Ibid. pg. 336
37 Popular nickname at the time referring to Justices Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter and
McReynolds
35
36
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However, in 1940 that ruling was overturned in Helvering v. Hallock, where
the same issue was presented to the Supreme Court. In a 5-4 decision, the Court
ruled for the government and deemed these trusts as liable for taxation upon death.
Owen Roberts was not the reason why the St. Louis Trust precedent had been
overturned five years later. Justice Van Devanter, a member of the Court’s
conservative wing, had retired in June of 1937 and been replaced by Hugo Black, a
much more liberal judge. Justice Roberts, this time in the minority, dissented against
the decision in Hallock, providing consistency with his votes in the St. Louis Trust
Cases. Roberts was forceful in his denunciation of the Hallock decision, saying “to
upset these precedents now, must necessarily shake the confidence of the bar and
the public.”38
If this were the end of the story, Justice Roberts would be seen as remarkably
principled in his approach to estate tax issues. However, the truth is anything of the
sort.
In 1933, the Court heard the case Helvering v. Duke, 290 U.S. 591, which was
re-petitioned as Helvering v. Northern Coal Company. It is a case that was not of
interest to the public or the media, and there exists very little information on the
case.
Helvering v. Duke concerned the same issue faced in the St. Louis Trust cases.
As Erwin Griswold wrote in his memoir on Roberts, the issue in Duke “presented the
question again in the following year.”39
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Griswold includes a footnote at the end of the sentence, which references the
St. Louis Trust cases. The Duke case, upon further research, shows to be concerned
with the same central issue as St. Louis Trust—conditional transfers of wealth, and
the estate tax.
Griswold also goes on to explain how the Duke case transpired. Chief Justice
Hughes recused himself from the case, due to a prior relationship with the
petitioner. The lower Court had ruled against the Government, so it stood that the
government needed to obtain five votes in order to have the decision reversed. A 44 split would affirm the decision of the lower Court, and rule against the
government.
That is exactly what happened. As evidenced by multiple sources, “a strange
result followed affirmances […] by an evenly divided court.”40 This quote comes
from Fordham Law Review’s “The Opinions of the United States Supreme Court from
the 1934 Term”, and the “evenly divided court” phrase is footnoted with “Helvering
v. Northern Coal Co., U.S. 290 591.”
Several questions arise. First, which four justices ruled against the
government, and affirmed the lower court’s ruling?
Here, Griswold states, “the Government knew quite definitely in advance that
four Justices would be against them-Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland
and Butler.”41

Osmond K. Fraenkel, “The Opinions of United States Supreme Court for the 1934 Term-General Issues,” 4 Fordham L. Rev. 416 (1935), pg. 453
41 Griswold, “Owen J. Roberts as a Judge” pg. 344
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23
This would posit that Roberts would have voted for the Government, and in
favor of the estate tax as applied to conditional transfers. It would be a vote
irreconcilable with the St. Louis Trust Cases, which dealt with an identical issue.
However, how could Griswold have known that Chief Justice Hughes recused
himself from the case, and which four Justices voted against the government? After
all, the opinion was issued per curiam, meaning that the majority-voting bloc was
anonymous.
It is a startling simple answer. Erwin Griswold argued the case, on behalf of
the government. As the case notes read, “Mr. Justin Miller, with whom Solicitor
General Biggs and Mr. Erwin N. Griswold were on the brief, for petitioner.”42
Griswold does not mention this obviously important fact in his very brief discussion
of the case.
Griswold’s biography supports this notion. He served as a special assistant to
the U.S. Solicitor General from 1929-1934. He would be a prime candidate to help
argue the government’s case before the Supreme Court.
The notion that Griswold argued the case on behalf of the government also
provides mens rea for Justice Roberts’s vote. Is it conceivable that Justice Roberts,
given the case’s very low profile and irrelevancy, would have voted in favor of the
Government as a favor to his friend Erwin Griswold? Griswold, keep in mind, was a
friend so close and dear that he was chosen, along with Roberts’s well-established
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mentor George Wharton Pepper, to write a memoriam of Roberts in the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review.
The only other option is to claim that Roberts somehow reversed positions
between the Duke and St. Louis Trust Cases. However, given Roberts’s strongly
worded dissent in Hallock, it begets the impression of a man who felt strongly about
the issue—not one who inconsistently wavered between positions.
Griswold’s own words would seem to support the former conclusion. He
writes that Roberts’s vote in 290 U.S. 591 (Duke) is “not so easy to explain.”43
However, he declines to mention the one fact that might provide clarity to the
otherwise befuddling vote: that Griswold himself argued the case for the
Government.
a. Conclusions
There is no connection, or skepticism, of Roberts’s successive votes in Duke,
St. Louis Trust and Hallock in any material besides the bit mentioned by Griswold.
This is not all too surprising given the low profile of the case and the per curiam
opinion.
However, the fact that Griswold argued the case before the Court provides an
otherwise unattainable firsthand account of what transpired, including which
justices voted in favor of the government, and which justice recused himself. It is
odd, but not all too surprising, that Griswold did not mention his involvement.
What a study of these cases does accomplish, however, is to cast a shadow of
doubt on Roberts’s “pragmatic” approach to constitutional issues. As the Duke vote
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shows, it appears that Roberts could perhaps be capable of compromising this
approach, even if just once or twice. There seems to be reasonable suspicion that
there was an ulterior motive behind Roberts’s vote in Duke, a fact that would make
any ulterior motive behind Parrish more likely. Given the estate tax cases, Roberts
has shown a precedent for casting mysterious, contradictory votes with little or no
explanation, a behavior that Justice Black noted in his strong opposition to the
Roberts retirement letter.
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III. Modeling Justice Roberts’s Voting Patterns
Do not put faith in what statistics say until you have carefully considered what they
do not say ~ William W. Watt

i. Advanced Quantitative Metrics
Justice Roberts’s vote in Parrish is conveniently referred to as a ”switch.” This
label, however, takes a simple approach to a far more convoluted and multifaceted
problem. True, Roberts seemed to have switched positions, in terms of minimum
wage and its constitutionality, between Morehead and Parrish.
However, even that reasoning has been disputed, primarily by the
“Internalist” camp. As Barry Cushman states in his piece, “Lost Fidelities,” it was
actually Nebbia v. New York, a case that upheld a New York statute regulating the
price of milk, which “heralded the death of Adkins.”44 Although Cushman’s
argument, and the rest of the Internalist camp, will be discussed in greater depth
later on, it is important to recognize a vital underpinning of the Internalist case:
Parrish was not an anomaly, but part of a trend; it was a more predictable vote than
otherwise given credit.
Thus, this section of the research hones in on that exact question of
predictability or anticipation. In order to gauge predictability, it is necessary to
establish an overall trend that details Roberts’s voting pattern. Because the Court at
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the time was especially segmented, with a distinct conservative bloc and a fairly
consistent liberal contingent, determining Roberts’s voting pattern is not as
daunting a task as it may appear.

a. The Ho & Quinn Study
Daniel Ho and Kevin Quinn, of Stanford Law and the University of CaliforniaBerkeley School of Law respectively, released a study in 2009 that is the most
advanced study to date of Justice Roberts’s voting patterns. They collected all cases
that Justice Roberts voted on from the 1931-1940 terms, excluding unanimous
decisions, and recorded whom Justice Roberts voted with. Thus, their research is
focused on voting blocs and which bloc Justice Roberts joined with on case after
case.
With the help of advanced quantitative modeling and metrics, including
Bayseian learning, Ho and Quinn are able to provide strong evidence that Justice
Roberts exhibited a sharp, significant shift to the left during the 1936 term.
Bayseian learning allows for a computer model to adjust its interpretation
based on the consistency of voting blocs. Essentially, it uses this intuition to hone
data and render more precise results. For example, a majority voting coalition made
up of the “four horsemen” plus Justice Roberts would move Roberts further to the
right because it would be a coalition that was very common during that time. In
contrast, a coalition of Roberts, two conservative justices and two liberal justices
(such Brandeis and Cardozo) would affect the data almost unnoticeably. This
coalition of two rigid conservatives and two liberal members would be such an
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unusual, one-off
off voting bloc that it would be treated in the dataset as a negligible
occurrence. Thus, after each case, moving chronologically from 1930 through
Parrish,, the system “learns” about the voting habits of the justices and whom they
tend to vote with.
Ho and Quinn, utilizing this dataset of non-unanimous cases, compile various
statistical analysis studies. Here is one, shown below45:

This model seeks to identify the “breakpoint” moment at which Roberts
underwent a significant deviation from his prior votes. The y-axis
axis denotes
ideological positions, the upper part conservative, and the lower part of the axis
liberal. The x-axis
axis places the cases in chronological order, starting with the 1934
term and finishing with Parrish
Parrish.
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As one can see, the 1936 term marks a statistically significant leftward
movement on the part of Justice Roberts. According to Ho and Quinn, these findings
“overwhelmingly confirm that the breakpoint occurred in the 1936 term.”46
Of course, this model only analyzes cases from 1934
1934-Parrish (1937). In a
different model, Ho and Quinn use all the cases from 1931
1931-1940 to assess
ssess Justice
Roberts’ss voting history. However, this graph, as seen below, separates these ten
Court terms into two distinct data groups: pre
pre-Parrish cases and post-Parrish
Parrish cases:

This type of modeling relies on “ideal” point estimates. Ideal point estimates
are a derivative of the Bayseian learning. As you can see above, Justice McReynolds’s
McReynold
“ideal point” is at the top portion of the graph, in the “conservative” territory of the
y-axis.
is. An ideal point refers to a jjustice’s preference. In McReynolds’ss case, an
analysis of his votes from 1931
1931-1940
1940 showed that he voted with the “conservative”
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bloc more so than any other justice. Thus, his “ideal” vote, or preference, is with the
conservative bloc.
Consequently, Justice Roberts’s “ideal” point is towards the very middle,
verifying the claim that he was often the swing justice on a majority of cases. Chief
Justice Hughes—often regarded as somewhat of a swing vote as well—sits directly
beneath Roberts towards the middle of the chart.
Here, the chart shows that Roberts exhibited a distinct shift in voting
patterns in the 1936 term. Because the pre and post Parrish terms are analyzed
separately in this model, one can see how greatly the 1936 term deviated from
Roberts’s traditional behavior. From 1936-1938, he is a more reliably liberal justice
than Hughes, and there is a tremendous “rupture” that separates the two data sets.47
This rupture signifies a marked change from Roberts’s behavior from 1931-1935.
Moreover, he is the only justice who has such a rupture, let alone the fact that his
ideal point line jumps nearly half of the graph. All of the other Justices are fairly
consistent from pre to post Parrish, and even the Justices who do exhibit a change
(such as Brandeis, who trends conservatively) do not do so in such a noticeable and
shocking way.
Lastly, one more model depicting the dataset helps to emphasize Roberts’s
dramatic shift during the 1936 term. This one, seen below, assumes that a justice’s
position has been “constant” from 1931-1940. The top graph assumes that Justice
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Stone’s position was constant, while the bottom graph assumes that Justice
Roberts’s position was48:

Here, there are two apparent observations that anchor Ho and Quinn’s thesis.
If you look at the Justice Stone model (top), you ssee,
ee, relative to Justice Stone,
Roberts shifted significantly leftward (y
(y-axis)
axis) during the 1936 term. The other
justices, relative to Justice Stone, vary in their positions: McReynolds follows a more
conservative path, while Cardozo a slightly more liberal one. Additionally, under the
Stone constancy model, the other justices all appear to shift independently of one
another.
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However, the lower graph tells a much different story. Assuming that Justice
Roberts stayed constant from 1931-1940, every other justice trended
conservatively—significantly so—during the 1936 term. By looking at the lines of
each other justice under the Roberts constancy model, one can readily see the
dramatic upward shift of each other justice.
Of course, the lower graph does not demonstrate reality; Justice Roberts was
anything but consistent in his voting patterns from 1931-1940. Thus, what this
graph depicts is that it was not the other justices who shifted, but rather, Roberts
himself.

ii. Original Dataset
a. Flaws in the Ho & Quinn Study
The Ho and Quinn study, while quite contemporary and unique, displays
several shortcomings.
The structure of the study, in terms of case selection, is flawed. The exclusion
of unanimous cases seems especially troubling. Although it may be true that
unanimous cases do not usually touch on the most contentious issues of the day (by
virtue of the lopsided vote) this is not always the case. One of the most important
pillars of President Roosevelt’s New Deal was the National Industrial Recovery Act.
In Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, this federal statute was struck down by a
9-0 margin. Here, while the unanimous vote signals that the justices
overwhelmingly agreed on the unconstitutionality of the legislation, it does not lend
credence to other qualitative aspects that are arguably more important, such as the
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magnitude of the legislation under review and the constitutional (or
unconstitutional) reason for its success or failure.
Secondly, the dataset compiled by Ho and Quinn is, as they readily admit,
“over inclusive, by focusing equally on all non-unanimous opinions.”49 This aspect of
the study is potentially more problematic. The Parrish vote, and the controversy
surrounding it, was distinctly related to the New Deal, labor rights, and/or economic
regulation. Including cases on free speech, for example, will shed negligible light on
a voting pattern that is constructed to analyze a minimum wage case.
Ho and Quinn address this shortcoming by noting how their methodology
“weighs” certain cases by giving greater emphasis to cases with repeating voting
blocs. “A case with unusual voting coalitions will be down weighted by the model
and will thus provide less information about the relative locations of the justices.”
Yet, they acknowledge in the next paragraph, “our analysis includes some
cases that aren't necessarily the primary focus of extant scholarship.”50 This is
somewhat of an understatement. There are a dozen cases, by their own admission,
that are of no value to Parrish.
These flaws help produce an imperfect study of Justice Roberts from 19311937. I submit that case selection should be the primary driver behind any
developed data set that seeks to measure Roberts’s voting patters relative to
Parrish. In order to truly evaluate whether Justice Roberts underwent a marked and
sudden deviation in Parrish, a narrower study that focused on similar economic or
labor issues will produce a more compelling and precise answer.
49
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Therefore, while Ho and Quinn developed a tremendous statistical program
for analyzing Roberts’s voting pattern, the shortcomings produce misleading results.
Thus, I undertook the task of compiling a dataset on Roberts’s Supreme Court votes
that would specifically hone in on case topic, and place less emphasis on nonunanimous cases that dealt with a completely separate issue.

b. Methodology
This new dataset consists of fifty-nine Supreme Court cases, ranging from the
1930 term through the Parrish case, which was part of the 1936 term. What
primarily distinguishes this dataset from Ho and Quinn’s is that these cases were
specifically chosen based on the issue presented.
Supreme Court decisions are qualitative and interpretative based. It is
important to reflect this quality in any quantitative study of Court cases. The
qualitative aspect most highlighted in determining this dataset was relevancy to the
Parrish decision. Parrish focused on a state law that mandated a minimum wage for
all public and private employees. All fifty-nine cases fall under the general umbrella
of economic regulation and/or labor rights, although they are not strictly reserved
to cases dealing with state statutes. Federal legislation on economic or labor issues
was also deemed relevant.
These cases were chosen by going through the United States Supreme Court
Reports, Volumes 282-300 (which cover the aforementioned terms) and analyzing
the decision reached in each case from those years. These decisions allowed myself
to accurately glean the constitutional issue that the court faced in each case. I did
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not discriminate between unanimous and non-unanimous cases that fell into these
categories. While I agree with Ho and Quinn’s premise that unanimous cases will not
shed much light on Justice Roberts’s judicial philosophy, these cases do promote an
important finding: the direction of the Court. A study of unanimous cases allows one
to ascertain whether the Court seems to lean “conservative” or “liberal” at a point in
time.
It is important to also note which cases I left out of the dataset. There were
many Supreme Court cases over these years that dealt with rates proscribed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. If the question facing the Court had to do with
whether a specific rate was fair or unfair (in terms of dollars and cents), the case
was excluded. If a constitutional issue was raised, it was included. I applied the same
standard to workmen’s compensation and liability cases. Any case before the Court
that dealt with a fair or unfair sum for injury in the workplace was excluded unless
it treaded on a constitutional issue. Usually, for these two subsets, the constitutional
issue would center on the 14th amendment, as was the case in 285 U.S. 22 (a
compensation case) and 284 U.S. 248 (an ICC rates case).
For each case deemed relevant, a few factors were noted. One was the central
issue in the case. A second was the Supreme Court’s ruling and the majorityminority split. The third aspect was the side on which Justice Roberts ruled. The
fourth aspect, and perhaps most important, was whether the decision rendered by
the Court was a “liberal” or “conservative” ruling. For the most part, these labels
were easier to apply than initially expected. The “liberal” standard included any
ruling that upheld state or federal legislation aimed at regulating business, or
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upheld any law that was pro-labor rights. These rulings took a broad view of the
Constitution, in general. The “conservative” standard took the opposite approach,
and included any ruling that struck down a state or federal statute regulating
business or proscribing labor rights. Generally, these rulings took a narrower view
of constitutional rights. If a case could not be clearly determined, I took to a closer
reading of the full opinion and (if available) dissent, and made a judgment. Appendix
A denotes the full table that was compiled for each case.
To effectively analyze the data, the cases were divided into three tiers. Tier
One included the most hotly contested cases, those decided by 5-4 or 6-3 margins.
Tier Two included any 7-2, 8-1, or unanimous decisions with a concurring opinion
written. Finally, Tier Three included only unanimous decisions where no
concurrence was penned or voiced.

c. Results: Tier One
The Tier One results are arguably the most important of all. These cases are
the ones where Roberts’s vote mattered the most; they are the cases that were
weighed most heavily in Ho and Quinn’s dataset for that reason. His judicial
tendencies are most directly revealed when his vote mattered, as they were perhaps
the toughest decisions to come to given the contested nature of the Court.
The chart below tracks Roberts votes in Tier One cases from the 1930 to
Parrish. A 5 (the upward end of the y-axis) means Robert cast a liberal vote, while a
2 (lower end of y-axis) means a conservative vote.
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axis shows, there were 22 cases in the Tier One data subset. This
As the x-axis
chart reveals surprising evidence that concurs with the conclusions reached by Ho
and Quinn. Here, in the most tightly decided Supreme Court cases, Justice Roberts
began his career leaning to the left on matters of economic regulation and labor
rights. In fact, on the first ten cases in this category Justice Roberts voted with the
liberal coalition 70% of the time. Case Ten, the last of Roberts’s string of liberal
votes, was 294 U.S. 240, U.S. v. Bankers Trust Co. (1935). This case is known as one of
the Gold Cases,, where the Court upheld the validity of federal legislation that
asserted any contract requiring payment in gold was “against public policy.”51 This
case was decided 5-4,
4, in favor of the governme
government,
nt, with the four conservative
horsemen joining together on a vigorous dissent
dissent.
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However, Roberts shifts sharply, and statistically significantly, to the right
thereafter. Over the next eleven cases that are very similar to the first ten in
category and vote margin, Roberts voted on the conservative side in 10/11 cases, or
91% of the time. It is an immense swing from the 70% liberal figure we saw in the
initial ten cases. These cases span from the 1934 to the 1936 term, and indicate a
sudden and quite verifiable switch in Roberts’s voting pattern.
This chart also indicates that the Parrish vote—the 22nd and final case in this
subset—was an anomaly. It became part of the very slim minority (9%) of cases that
Roberts voted with the liberals on; it could not have been expected by any outsider
using this dataset in trying to predict Roberts’s vote. All indications here, in studying
the closest Supreme Court decisions from 1931-1937, show that Justice Roberts had
moved to the right by the time Parrish came about. Ho and Quinn’s findings support
this conclusion, saying, “The late 1934 cases seem to suggest that Roberts may have
become more conservative.”52

d. Results: Tier Two
As stated, Tier One stands to tell the most about how Justice Roberts’s vote in
Parrish should be understood. The Tier One cases resemble Parrish in nearly every
facet.
Tier Two is important, however, in trying to identify a broader trend. Tier
Two cases include cases with some contention, as they include any case that was
decided 7-2, 8-1, or unanimous but with a concurrence, which indicates that the
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supportt was not completely uniform or on the same constitutional grounds. Tier
Two tells us about Roberts, certainly, but it also tells us about the direction of the
Court as a whole.

Using the same axis definitions as Tier 1, see chart below:
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contained eleven cases, the fewest of the three tiers. Yet
The Tier Two subset contai
once, again, one can notice a shift taking place, this time after case five. Case five was
293 U.S. 163, Hegeman Farms v. Baldwin (1934),, which challenged a New York
regulation that placed a minimum price on milk. The Court ruled in favor of the New
York statute, yet in Case 6 ((Borden’s v. Baldwin, 1934)53 the Court ruled against New
York (and remanded the case for further hearings) in regards to a different statute
regulating milk sales. In fact, the Court would continue this line of conservative
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ruling in Tier Two cases, which include the striking down of the NIRA54, until the
1935 term, when in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority55 the Court upheld the
federal government’s right to dispose of surplus electrical power provided by a
private company. Here, however, while the Court made a “unanimous” decision, four
justices signed onto a concurrence penned by Justice Cardozo, including Roberts.
Not only is the kind of disputed case that would fall through the cracks of Ho and
Quinn’s model, but it highlights a Court that was, if anything, cautiously liberal.
In conclusion, Tier Two highlights how the Court, as a whole, became slightly
more conservative from 1934 through Parrish on issues that were generally agreed
upon, but produced a modicum of disagreement.

e. Results: Tier Three
Tier Three provides insight into cases completely unaccounted for in the Ho
and Quinn dataset. Cases included in the Tier Three subset were decided
unanimously, with no concurrence, and they provide an accurate snapshot of the
Court’s general position on economic, regulatory, and labor matters over time.

The axes uses the same definitions as the Tier One and Tier Two models:
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Tier Three consists of twenty
twenty-six cases, and provides for an interesting look
into the view of the Court on issues relevant to Parrish from 1931-1937.
1937. Here, it is
readily apparent that the Court generally ruled in favor of the sta
state,
te, over the entire
period, on such issues. In fact, the Court trended “liberal” approximately 83% of the
time in Tier Three cases from 1931
1931-1935.
However, from 1935 until Parrish,, the Court ruled in favor of regulations
and/or the government only 71% of the time, issuing four conservative
onservative rulings in
that two-year time span. This reiterates the notion that the Court moved slightly to
the right around the 1935 term. However, it should be noted that this model still
shows the overall willingness of the Cour
Court to side,, rather overwhelmingly, with the
“liberal” paradigm throughout these years.

f. Conclusion from Dataset
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Taken together, this dataset presents a Court that, as a whole, seemed to
become slightly more conservative on matters of regulation and labor around late
1934-1935.
Justice Roberts stands as a microcosm of this overall trend. Amazingly,
Justice Roberts voted with the majority coalition on 57 out of the 59 cases included
here. Subtracting unanimous cases, which clearly distort the percentage, Justice
Roberts voted with the majority on 24 out of the 26 non-unanimous cases. Of
course, Justice Roberts was considered the “swing” vote on the Court, and that
observation shows that this perception was indeed reality.
Moreover, understanding the slightly overall drift of the Court to the
conservative side of these regulatory and labor issues makes the marked drift (seen
in Tier One) of Justice Roberts more understandable. He was evidently not the only
Justice who became slightly more conservative beginning the in 1935 term.
However, Justice Roberts’s drastic shift from a liberal to a conservative
jurisprudence gains due attention because of the fact that he was the Court’s
predominant swing vote. In 5-4 and 6-3 cases, his vote often decided, or helped to
decide, which way the Court would rule. Looking at the Tier One chart, this shift is
undeniable. The research done by Ho and Quinn verifies this slight rightward drift
prior to the Parrish vote. Ho and Quinn also identify that Roberts moved sharply to
the left during the 1936 term, when Parrish was decided.
What my dataset concludes to any reasonable observer is that Roberts’s vote
in Parrish could not have been expected or anticipated by even the keenest of Court
aficionados. On close cases dealing with issues very relevant to Parrish, Justice
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Roberts demonstrated a sharp turn to the right beginning in 1935. As Tiers Two and
Three show, he was also in line, generally, with the rest of his colleagues on the
bench.
However, the fact that the Court moved ever so slightly to the right in the
years proceeding Parrish makes Roberts’s vote even more surprising and
unexpected. He was bucking a trend that not only he had established, but the Court
as a whole had slightly established as well.
For the most part, this more specific, category-driven case dataset confirms
the findings of Ho and Quinn, that “unless the cases in the 1936 term [Parrish]
themselves are sharply different, they cannot be reconciled” with Roberts’s prior
voting record. As the dataset shows, for all intents and purposes, Justice Roberts’s
vote in Parrish could not have been predicted or anticipated. It was a “switch” in
every sense of the word.
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IV. Why did a Switch Occur?
Why shouldn’t the truth be stranger than fiction? Fiction, after all, has to make sense
~ Mark Twain

Part III of this research sought to clarify whether or not a sudden,
unpredictable or unanticipated switch occurred. Given the compiled dataset—which
focused primarily on the cases that were most relevant to Parrish—the answer
seems to be a resounding yes. The contemporary and advanced metrics published by
Ho and Quinn verify this finding. Justice Roberts seems to have suddenly altered his
jurisprudence in Parrish and the 1936 term. The “switch in time” long
acknowledged by popular history appears true.
The question now turns to the conundrum that has been ardently debated
since the day that Parrish was announced on March 29th, 1937.

Why the switch?

On this question, two fairly distinguishable camps have emerged with
competing hypotheses, the Externalist division and the Internalist division.
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i. Literature Overview
a. Externalist Camp
The Externalist camp unites scholars, academics and historians who believe
that Justice Roberts’s vote in Parrish was due to outside political factors.
Externalists “argue for the importance of politics,” in assessing the so-called
“constitutional revolution of 1937.”56 Most externalists focus on political
occurrences such as the 1936 Presidential election, which saw Roosevelt reelected
in a landslide, or President Roosevelt’s 1937 “court-packing” legislation as the main
influence behind Parrish.
The external hypothesis is thus slightly varied in regards to which political
factor was the main contributor to Justice Roberts’s Parrish vote.
President Roosevelt’s Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937, colloquially
known as the court-packing plan, is a prominent external event given great weight.
Laura Kalman, one of the renowned academics who attributes outside political
forces to Roberts’s Parrish vote, believes that “the Court's anxiety about the
possibility that Congress would try to curb it” contributed greatly to the sudden
reversal in Parrish.57
The court-packing hypothesis has been around for many years; in fact, it
arguably debuted the day after the Parrish decision. “Justice Owen J. Roberts
switched from the ‘conservative’ to the ‘liberal’ side” wrote Turner Catledge in the
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next day’s New York Times.58 A few weeks later, Yale Law Professor Abe Fortas
exclaimed to a group of labor activists, “Mr. Justice Roberts’s theory must be a
switch in time serves nine.”59 The idea of a switch in time that “saved nine,” which
debuted shortly after Parrish, is a blatant reference to the notion that Roberts had
succumbed to President Roosevelt’s assault on the Court. It was an assault that was
led by the “court-packing” bill. This initial reasoning behind Roberts’s vote—he had
done it to save the Court from FDR—was widespread from the start. Felix
Frankfurter, at the time a professor at Harvard Law, summarized this sentiment in a
letter to Roberts’s colleague, Justice Stone. The Parrish vote, according to
Frankfurter, was a “somersault,” and “"incapable of being attributed to a single
factor relevant to the professed judicial process. Everything that he now subscribes
to he rejected not only June first last, but as late as October twelfth.”60 October 12th
is a reference to the day that the Court denied a petition to rehear the Morehead
case, the case where New York’s minimum wage law was ruled unconstitutional on
June first.
However, the externalist camp focuses equally on the 1936 Presidential
election—where FDR soundly defeated Republican candidate Alf Landon— as a
factor that greatly influenced the Parrish outcome. This hypothesis is most often
asserted by Bruce Ackerman, whose book We the People 2: Transformations alleges
that the 1936 presidential election was the single most determinative factor in the
Parrish vote. In 1936, Ackerman writes, “the People had embraced the ideal of
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regulated capitalism with their eyes open […] the Old Court finally began to respond
with its switch in time.”61
The externalist camp, of course, counts among it many other scholars and
historians, many of whose arguments will be dissected later on. It has been the most
traditional and widely accepted explanation for the “switch in time.” However,
contemporary scholars and authors have spawned a contrarian viewpoint that
seeks to dispel of the externalist idea.

b. Internalist Camp
The Internalist camp takes issue with the notion that the Parrish case was a
result of political factors that influenced the Court’s decision. On this note, the
Internalist doctrine focuses on differences amongst cases, the changing way in
which legislation was drawn (as a result of past Court decisions) and more technical
legal matters as causes of Parrish. The internalist hypothesis does not generally
believe that an outside ulterior motivation pushed Justice Roberts towards the
liberal majority in Parrish.
The internalist theory gained wider recognition with the release of Barry
Cushman’s book, Rethinking the New Deal. In this work, Cushman advocates that
Parrish, instead of being an anomalistic or surprising outcome, was actually a few
years in the making. Cushman points to the 1934 Nebbia decision—where Roberts
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joined the liberal bloc to uphold a New York statute that regulated milk producers—
as the true turning point in the Court’s attitude towards the New Deal. 62
In fact, the internalist notion can perhaps be traced back to as far as 1945,
when Justice Roberts wrote the only explanation of his vote in Parrish. However,
this explanatory memorandum was not published until 1955, and was released by
Felix Frankfurter, who included the memorandum in his piece “Mr. Justice Roberts,”
which was written as a tribute upon Roberts’s passing. Frankfurter wrote “Mr.
Justice Roberts gave me this memorandum on November 9, 1945, after he had
resigned from the bench. He left the occasion for using it to my discretion.”63

The memorandum reads, in part:

"I stated to him [Justice Butler] that I would concur in any opinion which was based
on the fact that the State had not asked us to re-examine or overrule Adkins […] My
proper course would have been to concur specially on the narrow ground I had
taken. I did not do so. I said that I did not propose to review and re-examine the
Adkins case until a case should come to the Court requiring that this should be done
[…] it was that in the appeal in the Parrish case the authority of Adkins was
definitely assailed and the Court was asked to reconsider and overrule it. Thus, for
the first time, I was confronted with the necessity of facing the soundness of the
Adkins case.”

Here, Roberts recounts the events preceding Morehead and then Parrish, and
his rationale for voting the way he did in Parrish. According to Roberts, the Court
had not been asked to overrule the Adkins precedent in the initial case (Morehead).
However, he does say that he should have penned a concurrence to let it be known
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that he did not subscribe to the entirety of Butler’s majority opinion in Morehead.
According to Roberts, the important difference in Parrish was that the counsel had
asked the Court to reconsider Adkins.
This memorandum allegedly from Roberts spawned the notion that perhaps
the vote in Parrish was not a “switch” as it had seemed. Many internalist proponents,
in this spirit, argue litigation strategies, or the wording of the legislation itself, had
shifted between Morehead and Parrish.
However, other internalist theories, such as those focusing on the overall arc
of the Supreme Court and its history, have also gained attention. G. Edward White, in
his book The Constitution and the New Deal, argues this strain of internalist
thought. White claims that the Court, when looked at historically, has always been
slow to accept changes in constitutional thought. Using the child labor cases as an
example, White argues that the Court has always been slow to respond to gradual
evolving notions of constitutional authority, and that the “switch in time” was
nothing more than a final stand by a Supreme Court that had once again been slow
to change gears.64 This internalist theory does not depend at all on the Roberts
memorandum, yet still emphasizes the institution of the Court as the main reason
why Parrish occurred.

ii. A Grand Unifying Theory
Any complete theory that attempts to explain the motivation behind Justice
Roberts’s Parrish vote should provide a thorough portrait of Justice Roberts in not
64
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only 1937, but the years preceding it. As the dataset shows, Roberts not only tacked
leftward in 1937, but also tacked rightward in the 1934 term. The dataset also
shows, quite clearly, that Roberts initially started out as a fairly liberal-leaning
justice, siding with the Brandeis-Stone-Cardozo bloc on a majority of occasions from
the 1931 through 1933 terms.
Drew Pearson and Robert Allen published a book in 1936 entitled The Nine
Old Men which supports the latter assertion. On Roberts, they write that in “his first
two years on the Court […] he voted with the liberals on every important case.”65
Additionally, as the dataset shows, Roberts shifted drastically rightward
around the 1934 term, especially in cases that were decided by 5-4 or 6-3 margins.
This finding is supported by mounds of qualitative works. Barry Cushman, in an
essay for the Virginia Law Review entitled “Lost Fidelities,” advocates that Roberts’s
vote in Parrish was not a sudden switch of any sort. However, he does recognize that
Roberts underwent a conservative transformation a few years earlier, in 1934-1936.
“We find that there were cases decided between 1934 and 1937 in which […]
Roberts joined opinions invalidating statutory provisions […] implicated in Nebbia.
It is therefore entirely appropriate to suggest that [cases within these years] might
require somewhat more explanation.”66 Here, Cushman admits to the somewhat
befuddling jurisprudence of Roberts, specifically his pronounced conservative
transition in mid 1930’s. Louis Pollak, in a piece for the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, noted how Roberts “quickly aligned himself with Brandeis and Stone
[…] the three liberal Justices.” However, in 1935, “judicial tide began to turn against
65
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the New Deal,” primarily, as Pollak notes, due to Roberts’s shifting stance.67 Burt
Solomon stated rather abruptly, “He [Roberts] had indeed switched—not once, but
twice, first when he abandoned […] Nebbia […] then again […] on the minimum
wage.”68
As can be seen, the ebb and flow of Roberts’s career on the Court seesawed
from liberal, to conservative, to liberal in Parrish and the 1937 term. The basis for
this study is to understand the reasoning behind Justice Roberts’s vote in Parrish.
Hence, in order to construct a more verifiable picture, the most accurate explanation
should also clarify the reasons underpinning Justice Roberts’s conservative shift a
few years before Parrish. If Justice Roberts does not move to the conservative wing
of the Court in 1934-1936, then the Parrish vote would have raised few eyebrows.
This time period cannot be ignored; it appears that the “switch in time that saved
nine” is inextricably tied to Justice Roberts’s conservative movement two years
prior. The dataset shows that the conservative trend was too pronounced for it to be
ignored.
Thus, the need to explain the dataset—encompassing Roberts’s conservative
shift in 1934 and his leftward shift in Parrish— leads to a primary argument that is
often overlooked within the “switch in time” debates. It seems duly plausible,
perhaps likely, that Justice Roberts strongly considered running for President of the
United States in 1936, on the Republican ticket, where he would have opposed the
incumbent, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. It is an explanation that, besides being
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supported by original research conducted herein, satisfies the entirety of the
dataset’s findings.

iii. President Owen Roberts?
a. Context
Roberts’s rightward shift is first identified in 294 U.S. 500, Stewart Dry Goods
v. Lewis (1935), where a 6-3 Court struck down a Kentucky gross sales tax that
levied different rates on different volumes of business.
A few months before this decision was announced, the Democratic Party
had—in the context of history—a rare midterm electoral victory. Traditionally,
midterm elections trend against the President, yet in 1934, the Democratic Party
gained nine seats in both the House of Representatives and Senate. In the Senate,
they controlled 69 seats and in the House 322 seats, both overwhelming majorities
that have scant precedent in the annals of American history.
However, despite Roosevelt’s reassuring midterm victories, unrest was alive,
if not growing, in the United States. On the right, especially, a growing frustration
with President Roosevelt, coupled with the public’s 1934 reaffirmation of the
Democratic Party, forced party leaders and activists to reconsider their approach to
unseating Roosevelt in the upcoming 1936 Presidential election.
One particular organization that arose after the 1934 elections was the
American Liberty League. However, what separated the American Liberty League
from other organizations, and contributed to its rise, was its recruitment of high
profile political figures from both political parties. In fact, the four founding
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directors of the American Liberty League were Al Smith, Democratic candidate for
President 1928, John W. Davis, the Democratic nominee for President in 1924,
James Wadsworth, former Republican Senator from New York, and Nathan Miller,
the former Republican Governor of New York. Also instrumental in the Liberty
League’s creation were Irenee duPont, wealthy heir to the DuPont estate, and John
Raskob, former chairman of the Democratic National Committee 69 After formally
announcing the creation of the American Liberty League in late August of 1934, The
New York Times announced on page one that “the “League is Formed to Scan New
Deal, Protect Rights.”70 Over the next two years, the Liberty League would become
the foremost conservative organization in the country, with the explicit goal of
defeating President Roosevelt in the 1936 election. As the Liberty League repeatedly
stated, “If the League has taken issue with the New Deal, it is only because the New
Deal has taken issue with the Constitution.”71
The Liberty League was not a coalition of grassroots activists and local
organizers. Rather, it was a movement fueled by the wealthy, many of whom felt
threatened by Roosevelt’s economic politics. As The New York Times noted, “The
financial community sees in this movement a new force for conservatism.”72
Moreover, although the fusion of former Democratic candidates for President
with a predominantly conservative cause seemed odd to many—Time magazine
dubbed the League “a strange political nosegay”—George Wolfskill, who
documented the history of the American Liberty League in Revolt of the
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Conservatives, rightfully noted that “there was nothing strange at all about the
association of these men in the Liberty League […] the realignment was taking place
and the President was forced to a choice […] many of [the Liberty League] felt that it
implied an attack on the bedrock principles of the Republic. Others had a mutual
dislike […] of Roosevelt. The forces were sufficient to draw them together.”73
The American Liberty League was first connected to Owen Roberts by Fred
Rodell, in his 1955 book, Nine Men. Here, Rodell stated, “to exalt the Court for saving
the Republic […] the Liberty League had sprouted fast and made many a headline.”
He goes on to assert that the League was quite interested in drafting Justice Roberts
to seek the Republican nomination for President on the League’s anti-New Deal
platform. Roberts was, according to Rodell, by “no means unaware of popular
interest in the Court, and its members,” in running for President.74
Rodell’s assertions are unreferenced; as a result, little consideration has been
given to the idea that Justice Roberts seriously weighed a presidential candidacy in
1936. However, a closer look into the matter reveals tantalizing and original
evidence that Rodell, a Yale Law professor for over forty years, was not making an
unfounded claim.

b. Roberts Tacks Conservatively
Although Roberts had begun trending definitively rightward on the Court
during the 1934 term, it was not until May 6th 1935 that the country would take
notice as a whole. In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton, Roberts provided the
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deciding vote in a 5-4 decision that ruled the federal Railroad Retirement Act was
unconstitutional.75 The ruling also notably declared that the railroad’s pension
retirement system was unconstitutional.
Not only did Roberts provide the deciding vote, but he wrote the majority
decision as well. It was an opinion that was vehemently anti New Deal, and
espoused a strong laisezz-faire philosophy that outraged the left. In an editorial
published by The Nation, Roberts’s opinion was denounced as having “a complete
lack of common sense,” and was “a curious document.” Across the country, much of
the outrage had more to do with the opinion written by Roberts than with the
outcome of the case itself.76
The Liberty League, however, stood steadfastly by Justice Roberts and the
ruling. The League asserted that the Railroad Retirement Act and other New Deal
measures enacted in 1935 were “irresponsible deeds of a vindictive executive
lusting for power.” In fact, after the decision in Alton, Wolfskill noted that the
Republicans, buoyed by the activist Liberty League, “were showing signs of
rejuvenation.”77
As our dataset shows, the Alton vote was not an outlier; Justice Roberts
continued to vote with conservatives on similarly controversial New Deal measures
as the 1934 and 1935 terms transpired. William Leuchtenberg, a scholar of the
period, states in his book Supreme Court Reborn that “Roberts had started out as a
liberal with an affection for [Justice] Stone,” until “he switched.” The nation’s capitol,
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Leuchtenburg posits, began to speculate about what had cause Roberts to suddenly
“shift allegiances.”78
The Supreme Court finished the 1934 term on a conservative bang. On May
27th, 1935—colloquially known as “Black Monday,”—the Court unanimously struck
down three Roosevelt policies, including the National Industrial Recovery Act in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. The Wall Street Journal declared that the “Constitution
had survived the New Deal.”79
President Roosevelt was so distraught about the result, especially the
unanimity of the decisions, that he considered proposing an amendment to the
Constitution that would allow Congress to regulate wages, hours, and labor
conditions, among others. However, the Liberty League’s influence was so immense
at the time that Roosevelt was too nervous of the potential political backlash to
propose such measures. Felix Frankfurter, in a letter to President Roosevelt on May
29th, 1935, wrote “on the issue of the Supreme Court v. the President […] a general
attack on the Court … would give opponents a chance to play on vague fears […] and
upon the traditionalist loyalties the Supreme Court is still able to inspire.”80 The
Liberty League had become a threatening force in American politics.
Justice Roberts’s decisive vote in Alton had won him praise and recognition
from the Liberty League and other detractors of the New Deal. They took notice, and
began to mount a campaign to persuade Roberts to run for President.
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In June of 1935, only a month after Alton, the town of Macon, Georgia hosted
a Grass Roots Convention where speakers and attendees sought to “counteract the
appearance in government of the theories […] which are alien to America.” Wolfskill
stated that “there was much in the Macon meeting to appeal to the Liberty League.”
The convention espoused “basic views of the League’s philosophy.”81
However, there were more than just rhetorical similarities between the Grass
Roots Convention and the Liberty League organization. In fact, much of the
convention in Macon was paid for by the very same financiers of the Liberty League.
Pierre DuPont, whose family contributed publicly and heavily to the Liberty League,
donated $5,000 to the Grass Roots convention. Raskob, a founding member, donated
$5,000 dollars to the convention as well. In fact, both Raskob and DuPont would
state that “they believed in the principles” of the Grass Roots Convention.82
It seems likely that the Liberty League, with its eye on the 1936 Presidential
election, did not go further in supporting this convention because of its overtly
racist nature. At the conference, there were “obvious appeals to racial and religious
bigotry,” which would have sounded a death knell for the Liberty League if they had
chosen to publicly support the convention.83
Yet, there is no doubt, by DuPont and Raskob’s own admission, that much of
the Grass Roots convention’s stance on the New Deal paralleled that of the Liberty
League. In writing about the Grass Roots conference on June 13th, 1935 for the New
York Herald Tribune, a Republican paper that would cover such an event, Theodore
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Wallen stated that the convention “set the stage for the nomination of a strict
constructionist of the Constitution, thus virtually eliminating Associate Justice
Harlan F. Stone of the Supreme Court, while leaving Associate Justice Owen J.
Roberts in a preferred position.” 84
Justice Stone, of course, had dissatisfied conservatives and Republicans alike
by consistently voting with the more liberal bloc of the Court on the most
contentious issues of the time. At the time, along with Justices Brandeis and
Cardozo, Justice Stone consistently voted to uphold economic regulations, labor
rights, and other New Deal prerogatives. In fact, he voted with Brandeis and Cardozo
so often that the threesome became known as the “Three Musketeers.”
Walter Lippmann, a widely heralded American journalist, took notice of
Theodore Wallen’s piece in the New York Herald Tribune. He wrote that “Mr. Wallen
is an accurate correspondent, and his report faithfully reflects the fact that there is
considerable interest in the idea of going to the Supreme Court for the Republican
candidate in 1936 […] Justice Roberts, having decided against the New Deal
measures, is to run as savior of the Constitution.”85 He would go on to write that the
idea of Justice Roberts running as the Republican nominee in 1936 “is seriously
considered.” If he hadn’t already, “Mr. Justice Roberts will be compelled to take
notice.”86
After the Court recessed for the summer, the Liberty League continued to
campaign against Roosevelt, and the prospects of a Roberts presidency continued to
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swell with only one year until the nominating conventions. On May 26th, 1935,
famed political strategist Arthur Krock of the NY Times detailed how the 1936
Republican strategy “1(a)” was to nominate a “liberal conservative such as Justice
Roberts […] All but partisan Democrats, New Dealers and radicals will rally to the
standard.”87
The Hartford-Courant ran a piece during the summer of 1935 as well,
detailing the cream of the crop Republican candidates, which they called the “Group
A” of potential nominees. Roberts was included within the vaulted threesome.
“Group A consists of three men who by experience and standing would […] occupy a
stratum above the others,” Mark Sullivan wrote.88 On August 5th, 1935, the Chicago
Daily Tribune published a piece that quoted Robert Lucas, former Director of the
Republican National Committee, as suggesting Justice Roberts was being looked at
as a potential nominee, given that “Roberts […] would make a logical Republican
nominee, in a contest in which the constitution is likely to be the paramount
issue.”89
As the Court commenced the 1935 term in October, Justice Roberts
continued to vote conservatively on major cases, fueling speculation of a
presidential bid. In U.S. v Butler (1936), Justice Roberts again voted with the Four
Horsemen to strike down a prized Roosevelt New Deal measure, the Agricultural
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Adjustment Act. And once again, most tellingly, Justice Roberts also penned the
opinion for the majority.90
Ruling that the AAA was simply a “means to an unconstitutional end,”91
Roberts’s opinion in Butler sparked a similar outrage as Alton had. Roberts’s fellow
colleague, Justice Harlan Stone, wrote his sons “I doubt if any action of the Supreme
Court has stirred the country so deeply since the Dred Scott decision.”92
Burt Solomon, author of FDR v. The Constitution surmised that Roberts’s
opinion in Butler—not specifically the ruling of the Court—“sparked outrage all over
the country.” Roscoe Pound, dean of Harvard Law School, “derided” Roberts’s
“simplistic” jurisprudence that was akin to a “slot machine theory of judicial
review.”93 The Harvard Law Review mocked the Butler opinion as taking a “novel
approach” to the constitution, while Roberts’s own alma mater, the University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, took the opinion to task for “purporting to adopt a liberal
construction of the federal government’s taxing power,” while it “has in effect,
created merely an indefinite limitation on the exercise of this power, the extent of
which is known only to the Court itself.”94
Despite howls about Justice Roberts’s jurisprudence in Butler—it’s “Housethat-Jack-Built reasoning, as Justice Stone privately put it95— the decision won great
support from conservatives, and especially the American Liberty League. Liberty
League leader Al Smith gave a speech a week after the Butler decision that was
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described as a “climax.” Wolfskill wrote, “Liberty League leaders would look back to
their high adventure in January [1936].”96 A few weeks later, Liberty League leader
Jouett Shouse would exclaim “Roosevelt faces almost certain defeat in November.”97
Justice Roberts had once again provided the deciding vote in a watershed New Deal
case. The Liberty League, whose entire existence was predicated on the
unconstitutionality of the New Deal, had a figure of the highest constitutional
authority in their corner. Senator John Bankhead of Alabama called the Roberts
opinion in Butler “a political stump speech.”98
The harmony between Roberts’s interpretation of the constitution and the
Liberty League’s continued. From January 1936 through the end of the Court’s term
in June, the Supreme Court and Justice Roberts continued to strike down New Deal
measures, such as the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 in Carter v. Carter
Coal Co.99 Carter Coal was another high profile case involving New Deal legislation,
but Justice Roberts also joined with the Four Horsemen prior to Carter Coal on a
spate of other cases that garnered less attention yet continued his string of
conservative positions on economic regulation and labor issues.100
As the 1935 term progressed, a variety of primary sources support the
assertion that Justice Roberts was still under strong consideration for the
Presidential nomination. Given the Liberty League’s growing influence and
Roberts’s continued unabashed conservatism, it seemed only logical. On March 13th,
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1936, The Evening Independent of St. Petersburg, Florida, published an article
exploring the possibility that Kansas Governor Alf Landon would become the
Republican nominee for President later that year. However, the news piece made
sure to state that “some of the influential GOP politicos still […] express a feeling
that a stronger and more perfect candidate […] is somewhere in the offing. They
don’t mean Knox, Dickinson, or Vandenberg—whose last speech aroused no
enthusiasm […] [they] mean Justice Owen J. Roberts of the Supreme Court.”101
In May 1936, Fortune magazine ran a profile on Justice Roberts. In the piece,
the author stated that because the Constitution was primed to be a major issue in
the 1936 Presidential election, there was “considerable talk” of Roberts as a “viable”
candidate.102 On May 3rd, 1936, The New York Times, in a preview of the potential
GOP candidates, asserted “It [GOP] might offer the crown […] to Supreme Court
Justice Owen J. Roberts.”103 Later that month, the Times reported that Roberts was
set to receive a “favorable son” designation by the Pennsylvania delegation at the
Republican nominating convention in June.104
Talk of Roberts being nominated for President in the first half of 1936 could
come as no surprise to anyone, as Walter Lippmann, Arthur Krock, and others had
identified his potential candidacy as early as the middle of 1935. Not only had
various outlets explicitly mentioned Justice Roberts as a potential nominee, but
Roberts’s was hailed in some quarters as a “perfect” candidate—a “Group A”
nominee. That his name continued to be invoked with regards to the Presidency
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attests to his conservative opinions in Alton, Butler, and other cases which endeared
him to the Republican base and the Liberty League, keeping his name in the fold.
Pearson and Allen, in Nine Old Men, reflect this overriding sentiment. In the
chapter on Justice Roberts, they write “before his AAA [Butler] decision […] he went
through one of the most troubled […] periods of his life. His trouble was a disease
which affects many prominent men in an election year- presidentitis.” There were
many favorable qualities that Justice Roberts bought to the table, Pearson and Allen
note. He was a “candidate with prestige and popularity […] [and had] the aura of
liberalism surrounding his early decisions.” Moreover, Roberts hailed from
Pennsylvania, a state which “commands the second largest vote in the electoral
college.”105The authors concluded with the bit by saying, “Roberts considered the
possibilities most seriously.”106
Clearly, Justice Roberts was mentioned often and seriously as a contender for
the Republican nomination. His voting record aligns with someone who tried to
placate a conservative Republican base, led by the Liberty League, with consistent
anti New Deal rulings that ran counter to his prior record. This much is clear.
Leonard Baker, author of Back to Back: The Dueling Presidency, agrees with this
premise supported by my original dataset and qualitative research:

It was a suggestion encouraged by Roberts’s friends and members of his
family. It was during this time that his philosophy, as expressed in Court
opinion and votes, see-sawed from liberal to the conservative side. Finally, as
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the political suggestions grew louder, his philosophy became more in line
with what was considered the philosophy of the Republican Party.107

iv. Associations Between Roberts and the Liberty League
However, previous mentions of a potential Roberts candidacy—by Baker,
Pearson, and Rodell, among others—fail to establish any evidence beyond
conjecture in the press, and quotes from Roberts’s family and friends who chose to
remain anonymous.
However, as stated above, it is a theory that, if accurate, would explain more
of Roberts’s voting record than any “externalist” theory to date. It would clarify not
only Roberts’s vote in Parrish—made after Roosevelt was reelected, and long after
his potential candidacy was extinguished—but also his rightward jurisprudential
shift in 1935 and 1936, which made Parrish so surprising in the first place.
Looking at the situation through a general historical lens, the narrative
advanced by Lippmann, Wallen, and others makes a great deal of sense. The
American Liberty League was founded as a principally anti-New Deal group. Given
that Justice Roberts was the face of constitutional opposition to the New Deal, it
seems perfectly reasonable that he would be the Liberty League’s preferred
candidate. He was most directly involved, even on the front lines, in the battle
against the New Deal, and demonstrated a growing propensity for striking down
New Deal measure after New Deal measure, a philosophy that meshed seamlessly
with the Liberty League’s.
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No connection beyond these sources and parallels between the Liberty
League and Roberts has previously been established. However, this paper will
introduce originally compiled research that, as a whole, sheds an entirely credible
light upon the notion that Roberts eyed a potential candidacy fueled by the Liberty
League’s anti-New Deal platform.

a. The American Law Institute
On August 25th, 1935, about two months after Wallen had stated that Justice
Roberts was being mentioned at various Liberty League-related events as a possible
national candidate, The New York Times published an article, entitled “Bar Group
Studies Constitutionality of New Deal Acts,” which reported that the American
Liberty League had convened a committee of 50 prominent national lawyers to
“study the constitutionality of New Deal legislation,” and make an initial report by
September.
This committee was branded, in the sub-heading of The New York Times
piece, as being composed of “lawyers of different political faiths.” In the article itself,
The Times stated that the lawyers were “serving without pay;” moreover, the
committee would be conducted in a “strictly professional nature.”108
The implication that the committee would be independent and open-minded
was a misleading one. As Wolfskill notes, “at least a dozen members of the
committee held some important post in the League,” and perhaps most shockingly,
the American Liberty League did fund the commission. Liberty League leader Jouett
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Shouse appropriated $25,000 to the Chairman of the commission, Raoul Desvernine,
for “such purpose as the Chairman of the Lawyer’s National Committee [Desvernine]
shall authorize and approve of.”109The study was certainly far from independent. To
this point, President Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, sarcastically
commented that the committee was “Chief Justice Jouett Shouse [President of the
Liberty League] and his fifty-seven varieties of associate justices.”110
The list of the participating lawyers that was published by The New York
Times provided a reference point by which to research any potential associations
between Roberts and the participants of the committee. In fact, Justice Roberts had a
close association with two of the people on the list—via the same organization.
In 1927, the American Law Institute published a speech in the Michigan Law
Review that was read at the “Annual Meeting of the Michigan State Bar Association.”
The American Law Institute was describing a goal of the organization, which was to
“make a statement of the common law, in its various branches.” The speech went on
to describe how the Institute functioned, describing how the “governing body of the
Institute is a Council of thirty-two members, and an executive committee of that
council.” The speech then mentioned five lawyers who composed this executive
“Council;” three being Owen Roberts, George W. Wickersham, and John W. Davis.111
The latter two are lawyers who would later become members of the Liberty
League’s National Lawyer Committee, and were listed in The New York Times as well
as in Wolfskill’s account of the League.
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However, not only were Davis and Wickersham members of the sham
“independent” council created and funded by the Liberty League, but they were also
leaders of the League itself. John W. Davis, as previously mentioned, was a founder
of the American Liberty League and regarded as one of “the big names of the
League.”112
George W. Wickersham was a public leader of the American Liberty League
as well. In 1935, the Gridiron Club performed a widely heralded mockery of the
Liberty League, dressing in costume as only nine “Liberty Leaguers, Jouett Shouse,
John W. Davis […] George Wickersham.”113 Both Davis and Wickersham were not
only members of the Lawyer’s committee founded to investigate the
constitutionality of the New Deal, but became prominent faces of the movement.
They were also associates of the future Justice Roberts while serving
together on the board of the American Law Institute. According to the American Law
Institute’s archives Wickersham was actually President of the organization from
1923 through 1936.114 George Wharton Pepper, Roberts’s mentor since his law
school days, co-founded the Institute and later served as its President. Wharton
Pepper, as will be discussed, was a supporter of the American Liberty League as
well.115
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b. Roberts and J.P. Morgan
Davis had a long and noteworthy relationship with Roberts that extended far
beyond the executive council of the American Law Institute. In 1921, Davis left his
post as Ambassador to Great Britain to found and head the Davis, Polk, and
Wardwell law firm. One of his firm’s major clients was J.P. Morgan; in fact, the firm
considered Davis its chief counsel.116 Roberts, like Davis, was also heavily involved
with J.P. Morgan. In fact, when the Banking Investigation committee analyzed the
finances of the J.P. Morgan Co. during an investigation in 1933, it found that Roberts
himself had been on a preferred stock purchase list which was the focus of the
investigation. Essentially, Roberts had bought stock of J.P. Morgan “well below the
market quotation.”117 This finding was one that would cause Roberts
embarrassment years later when it became public knowledge while he served on
the Supreme Court.
The list of preferred stock recipients, published by The New York Times
during the Senate investigation of the affair, is revealing. On the list, aside from
Roberts and Davis, are George Wharton Pepper and John Raskob, co-founder and
prominent member of the Liberty League.118
The reason Roberts was so cozy with J.P Morgan, and able to purchase such
discounted stock was due to his many connections to the firm. His “old friend,”119
Sydney E. Hutchinson, was the son-in law of E.T. Stotesbury, a partner in the J.P.
Morgan Company. Hutchinson was so close to Roberts that Pearson and Allen
116
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identified him as making “highly important contributions to his business and
political advancement.”120 Stotesbury, unsurprisingly, was issued the preferred
stock as well.
Furthermore, Roberts had other personal connection to J.P. Morgan. Another
one of Roberts’s closest friends who would make “highly important contributions to
his business and political advancement” was Thomas Sovereign Gates, President of
the University of Pennsylvania and a former partner of Drexel and Co. and J.P.
Morgan. In fact, Gates and Roberts would become closer—they married a pair of
sisters, the Rogers sisters who hailed from Connecticut. Eventually, Thomas Gates
would jump back to an “important position” with Drexel and J.P. Morgan, and stayed
with the two companies until his retirement in 1930—the year after the infamous
stock purchase, which Gates participated in as well.121
Roberts also had professional involvement with J.P. Morgan. His law firm,
which he founded in 1912 with two other partners, served Drexel and Company as
one of its main clients. Drexel and Co. is described by Burt Solomon as an “affiliate”
of J.P. Morgan122, and Roberts counted Drexel and Co. as a major client until he
resigned from the firm in 1930 upon his appointment to the Court. During this time,
Davis continued to serve as the chief counsel for J.P. Morgan, including in 1929
when the firm sold Roberts the illegal stock. Stotesbury— the father-in law of
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Sydney Hutchinson, Roberts’s dear friend—was described as the “head of Drexel
and Company” in 1933.123
J.P. Morgan was a hotbed for the American Liberty League. Besides John W.
Davis, a known leader within the organization, Stotesbury was identified by
Wolfskill as a member of the Liberty League. In fact, Stotesbury was a prominent
financial supporter of a group called the Sentinels of the Republic. The group was
considered a sub-organization of the Liberty League, “one of the interlocking
branches of the Liberty League.”
Besides Stotesbury, prominent financiers of the Sentinels included George
Wharton Pepper.124Pepper was not only a financier but also a leader of the Sentinels;
on October 18th, 1935, he delivered the keynote address at the official Sentinels of
the Republic conference.125 Wharton Pepper is a key figure in the puzzle. He was
described as having a “hatred of Roosevelt and the New Deal,” and had a “core of
bitterness” towards the President.126 This was the man who not only mentored
Roberts since law school, but provided for his entry into politics by recommending
him to head President Coolidge’s Teapot Dome investigatory team.
Thus, Roberts’s association with John W. Davis extends far beyond being
board members of the American Law Institute. Roberts was one of the select few
invited to purchase discounted J.P. Morgan stock, an invitation that doesn’t seem
surprising given his powerful associations within the firm: John W. Davis, its chief
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counsel, close lifelong friend Sydney Hutchinson, the son-in law of J.P. Morgan
partner (and Drexel and Co. “head”) Edward T. Stotesbury, and his brother-in-law
Thomas Gates, another J.P. Morgan executive.
Only a few years after the stock issuance, it would be the leaders of this very
institution—John W. Davis, politically, and Edward Stotesbury, financially—who
would become vital mainstays of the American Liberty League. Roberts’s mentor
George Wharton Pepper was also involved in the League’s causes. Would these same
actors, Stotesbury, Wharton Pepper, Gates, Hutchinson and Davis—who had
previously enriched themselves with J.P. Morgan stock—be morally immune from
trying to draft close and accomplished friend Owen J. Roberts into a race against
Roosevelt a few years later, at the behest of an organization, the Liberty League,
which they led and funded?

c. Roberts and the Wideners
A dissection of other associations in Roberts’s past ties him to the Liberty
League even further. In 1904, still only a few years out of the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, Roberts accepted a job as an attorney for the Philadelphia
Rapid Transit Company. He worked for Charles Leaming, the chief counsel for P.R.T.,
and became one of “Leaming’s ablest assistants […] He was worth every cent that
P.R.T. paid him.”127 The Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. was a mega-corporation in its
day, and was principally founded and financed by two “old money” estates: The
Wideners and the Elkinses.
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The American Taxpayer’s League was another one of the smaller, single-issue
groups that fell under the American Liberty League’s increasingly expanding
umbrella. The American Taxpayer League, which predated the Liberty League by
two decades, was run by “veteran conservative” James A. Arnold. A Congressional
investigation into the American Taxpayer League found that Arnold had raised
“nearly a million dollars,” almost exclusively from “a small group of utility and
industrial concerns, prominent in them […] the P.A.B. Widener estate.”128 In 1935,
Arnold raised nearly $45,000 from a small group of donors that included Irenee
DuPont and “other DuPont's,” who were the most notorious financiers of the
American Liberty League and its affiliates. In fact, the American Taxpayer’s League
received free press and radio time from William Randolph Hearst’s New York radio
station, WINS, and the National Broadcasting Co. facilities.129 Hearst himself was an
expressed supporter of the Liberty League and supported a 3rd party candidacy on a
“constitutional” platform for the 1936 election.130
The P.A.B. Widener estate, and all of its subsidiary companies, was
principally run by Joseph E. Widener, who as an individual was a prominent and
direct contributor to the Liberty League as well. In 1935, The New York Times
reported that Widener had donated $10,000 dollars to the Liberty League131; the
following year, he donated $10,000 more. These figures match the donations of
John Raskob, leader of the League, and Alfred P. Sloan, the CEO of General Motors
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who, along with the DuPont’s, was a principal financier of the American Liberty
League. 132
The American Taxpayer League, funded in large part by the Wideners, was a
principal subsidiary of the American Liberty League. Moreover, Joseph Widener,
who controlled the estate at the time in question, was a noted donor to the
American Liberty League directly. The Wideners, given their Philadelphia roots and
connection with Roberts early in his life, would surely have maintained a
relationship with their former employee as he ascended to the position of Associate
Justice on the Supreme Court. Given this association, and the Widener’s and
Roberts’s intimate involvement with the city of Philadelphia their entire lives, they
were certainly no strangers.

d. Roberts and Pierre DuPont
Besides strong connections to Liberty League leaders such as John W. Davis,
George Wharton Pepper, and George Wickersham, and financiers such as E.T.
Stotesbury and the Widener family, Roberts had perhaps his strongest and most
natural bond with a family who were both a public leaders and prominent financiers
of the American Liberty League.
Pierre DuPont, whose wealth came from the DuPont chemical company, was
perhaps the most prominent financier of the American Liberty League and its
various umbrella organizations. The DuPont family, mainly Irenee DuPont and
Pierre DuPont, contributed approximately 30% of the entire Liberty League’s
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funding in 1935. It is estimated that one out of every four dollars spent by the
Liberty League came from the DuPont family.133Upon the organization’s founding,
Irenee DuPont was named as a director along with folks such as John W. Davis, Al
Smith, Nathan Miller and James Wadsworth.
Pierre DuPont had a connection with Roberts that transcended politics. In
fact, both were leaders of an organization that is built on forming bonds between
individuals: the Boy Scouts, specifically, the one on the Horseshoe Scout Reservation
in Pennsylvania.
Owen Roberts became somewhat of a savior of the Horseshoe Scout
Reservation, according to their Alumni Association website. Specifically, Roberts
was revered in the organization for undertaking a massive fundraising venture
during the Great Depression that allowed the camp to continue thriving. According
to the website, in 1930—only a year after the stock market crash—Roberts
accomplished this by enlisting “some of the most prominent people in the County to
aid in this effort.” It was no small feat: Roberts succeeded in raising $150,000
dollars, (nearly $2 million in today’s terms) a success which earned him the
distinction of being named Chairman of the governing council’s Executive Board.134
Pierre DuPont was a fellow leader of the Horseshoe Scout Reservation—and
a major benefactor to Roberts’s massive fundraising mission. In the group’s history,
Roberts’s fundraising drive was said to have “called on DuPont and other major
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corporations” to secure the necessary funding.135 In fact, DuPont himself, many
times, hosted various ceremonies for the Reservation at his home in Longwood. In
1929, he hosted a reception at his house where he was awarded a statue “in honor
of his service” towards the organization. Later, he hosted a “Council Camporee” at
the same estate.136 DuPont and Roberts were not just members of the Boy Scouts—
they were together leaders of a specific Boy Scout Reservation, the Horseshoe Scout
Reservation, which is located in Chester County, Pennsylvania.
In 1928, the alumni association of this reservation wrote about a Reception
Committee, which met to bestow honors and new ranks to various members.
Besides DuPont and Roberts, a man named A. Atwater Kent was mentioned as a part
of this “prominent” committee. Atwater Kent would become a financial supporter of
the Liberty League, donating to many of the same causes as the DuPont’s. 137 In fact,
Atwater was specifically associated with the Sentinels of the Republic, the same
Liberty-League affiliate that was heavily financed by E.T. Stotesbury and George
Wharton Pepper.
Pierre DuPont and Owen Roberts were not merely members of the same
Horseshoe Scout Reservation organization. They were both intimately involved with
the group—Roberts spearheaded a notable fundraising drive, mainly successful due
to DuPont’s donations, and later become Chairman. At the same time, DuPont,
besides contributing significant sums of money, hosted a spate of Horseshoe events
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at his personal estate and was recognized for his service and dedication to the club.
They cared intimately for the Horseshoe Reservation and made sure that it would
continue to thrive for generations to come.
It appears clear that Owen Roberts had enough very strong and close ties to
the American Liberty League that Rodell’s assertion that the League had tried
“drafting” Roberts to run against Roosevelt in 1936 is anything but a baseless claim.
His well established ties with figures such as Wharton Pepper, Stotesbury, Pierre
DuPont, Wickersham and John W. Davis support the sentiment voiced by Rodell,
Pearson, Baker and others: Roberts closely eyed a Presidential run in 1936, and
considered it strongly enough that his ever teetering jurisprudence swayed
rightward. Among the American Liberty League, Roberts was close with several of
its leader and a handful of its main financiers, through interactions spanning many,
many years. If John W. Davis, Pierre DuPont, and the other leaders of the American
Liberty League had wanted a “savior of the Constitution” to run against Roosevelt,
they would not have to look very far at all. They would also not have to find a way to
get in touch with Roberts.
However, there exists further original evidence that shows that Roberts held
dear to his heart an issue that was a guiding principle of the Liberty League.

e. Owen Roberts, The Crusaders, & The American Liberty League
The first mention of an organization called “The Crusaders” came in a piece
by The New York Times, published on April 12th, 1938—after Roosevelt had been
reelected, after the controversial Parrish outcome and after the Liberty League had
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de-summitted from its apex. The piece discusses an investigation by a Congressional
lobby committee into the “financing of the Crusaders and other groups hostile to the
New Deal.” The article reports that the committee had found surprising results:
Irenee DuPont and Alfred P. Sloan had donated $10,000 each to this organization,
and qualified these donations as being “large shares of [The Crusaders] operating
funds.”138
The association between The Crusaders and the Liberty League, in fact, runs
much deeper than even the financing indicates. The Crusaders were a natural
successor to the Americans Against the Prohibition Amendment organization, or
AAPA, which was formed in 1918 to protest the 18th Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.139 As Wolfskill writes, “The Crusaders and the Women’s Organization
for National Prohibition Reform were more than auxiliaries of the AAPA. They were
blood relatives.”140
The Crusaders were “young men […] who were scions of the wealthiest
families in the land.”141 In 1933, The Crusaders, AAPA, and its brethren achieved
their goal of Prohibition repeal. However, as opposed to dismantling, the leaders of
The Crusaders and the AAPA, its parent organization, simply moved onto other
initiatives. In fact, the majority of them focused on founding a different group—The
American Liberty League.
In 1934, when “John Raskob initiated the series of early meetings that
culminated in the formation of the American Liberty League, it was a simple matter
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to summon […] members of the AAPA. The former executive committee of the AAPA
was ‘unanimously of opinion’ to assist in the new organization.”142
These two groups were not just composed of similar members or even
similar leaders. Wolfskill declared that the AAPA had become a “new organization
[…] the American Liberty League.”143
The Crusaders itself persisted after the repeal of Prohibition in 1933.
However, it was understood to be simply another branch of the American Liberty
League. The Crusader’s “national advisory council […] all […] were members of the
Executive Committee of the Liberty League.”144
In fact, one of those advisors who sat on the Board of both The Crusaders and
the Liberty League was none other than John W. Davis, whom Roberts had known
intimately through the executive board of the American Law Institute and J.P.
Morgan.
Most importantly, Justice Roberts was known for exactly the issue that The
Crusaders and AAPA formed around: Prohibition repeal. In fact, Roberts was very
much an ally of the AAPA, and a strong public advocate for their primary cause. He
was such an outspoken proponent of prohibition repeal that it nearly derailed his
Supreme Court nomination. As Charles Leonard notes in his study of Roberts’s
decisions, entitled A Search for a Judicial Philosophy, “the only serious objection to
[Roberts’s] confirmation arose over his views on the 18th amendment.” There was
ample evidence to support this wariness. In a 1923 speech to the American Bankers
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Association, Roberts denounced Prohibition as a “police regulation,” which violated
the Constitution. In fact, he was so rabidly against Prohibition that he even refused
to serve on President Hoover’s commission charged to investigate enforcement of
Prohibition. The Sun (Baltimore) columnist Frank R. Kent noted, “there ought to be
some opposition to Roberts,” based on his well-documented belief that the 18th
amendment “has no business in the Constitution at all.” 145
Even the University of Pennsylvania, in a publication that detailed the life and
legacy of Roberts, noted Roberts’s avowed resistance to Prohibition as one of his
main legacies. “Somehow, Roberts managed to allay the fears of the most ardent
supports of Prohibition,” despite his past statements where he had “decried the 18th
amendment.”146
However, Roberts not only publicly supported the platform of the AAPA, but
also had a personal connection with the organization. In fact, Roberts’s law
partner—with whom he co-founded a private practice in Philadelphia in 1912—
would become the director of the AAPA a few years after starting the firm. This
connection was so clearly important and obvious that it became the major source of
Senatorial opposition to Roberts’s Supreme Court nomination. As the New York
Herald Tribune noted at the time of the nomination battle, Roberts’s law partner was
a “militant wet,” whose avid anti-Prohibition stance elevated him within the ranks of
the AAPA.147
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Clearly, Justice Roberts not only had a myriad of financial and political
connections to the American Liberty League, but also shared at least one area of
common concern. Given Justice Roberts’s opposition to Prohibition as a well-known
public figure, he was a vital ally to the AAPA, the Crusaders, and their related
affiliates.
The connection is important because it seems quite viable that the thought of
drafting Justice Roberts for President—after he became the driver against the New
Deal on the Supreme Court—would relate back to his successful allegiance with
anti-Prohibition groups that had then transitioned to the American Liberty League.
Between John W. Davis, leader of the Crusaders and the American Liberty League,
and Roberts’s former law partner—an association that nearly derailed his Supreme
Court nomination—Roberts’s historical record demonstrates a consistent and
marked connection with an organization and cause that formed the very basis of the
American Liberty League. It was a cause Roberts vehemently believed in. Roberts
had been affiliated with ‘Liberty Leaguer’s’ and their causes long before they became
the American Liberty League. He was, especially given his anti-New Deal stance,
undoubtedly one of them.

v. The Nomination Vanishes & Roosevelt Wins
Thus far, this paper demonstrates that Justice Roberts’s name was
consistently invoked as a potential Republican candidate, and that his votes in Alton,
Butler, and other economic cases became more outspokenly conservative as the
1936 election approached. Prior to the election, the American Liberty League had
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transformed into a dynamic, bi-partisan association that was determined on making
the unconstitutionality of the New Deal the focus of the election. Some speculated
that the American Liberty League had fixated on Roberts as their preferred
candidate given his position of authority on this matter. This research shows that
there was indeed a marked and definitive connection between Justice Roberts and
the leaders of the American Liberty League. Justice Roberts had close and personal
ties with so many key Liberty League leaders and financiers that the speculation of
collusion between the two seems certain.
Of course, Justice Roberts was not nominated as the Republican candidate for
President in 1936. Nevertheless, a close dissection of the period leading up to the
GOP’s June nominating convention in Cleveland supports the notion that Roberts
keenly eyed a Presidential run. In fact, he may have so closely vied a candidacy that
he ended up overstepping political boundaries that extinguished any hope of higher
office.

a. The Morehead Case
In Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, the final case of the 1935 term, the
Supreme Court invalidated a NY statute that mandated minimum wages for all
workers within the state. The vote followed the same formula as other contentious
New Deal cases that came before: Justice Roberts voting to strike down the measure,
joined by the “Four Horsemen,” with Hughes, Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo
dissenting.
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The case was decided only months before the Republican nominating
convention, held in June, and was announced just days before the convention.
Morehead itself was the decision that provided the baseline for the outrage ten
months later in Parrish. A close look at Morehead reveals that Roberts’s decisionmaking ability had indeed been compromised by the “presidentitis” that Pearson
and Allen had identified.
Roberts’s presidential prospects were nullified in Morehead because the
decision provoked an “immediate and vociferous” backlash that eclipsed the
negativity from Alton and Butler. Unlike the reaction to Alton and Butler, the
Morehead ruling provoked criticism from all corners of the political world—even
from Republicans and conservatives. As John Chambers notes in his analysis entitled
The Big Switch, former Republican President Herbert Hoover agreed, “the Court had
gone too far.” The New York Herald-Tribune, a Republican outlet, voiced opposition
to the decision in Morehead. Republican Congressman Hamilton Fish notably called
the majority ruling a “Dred Scott decision.” A study conducted found that nearly
80% of all newspaper editorials disputed the opinion of Roberts and the Four
Horsemen. To some, including “prominent” conservative Washington Post columnist
Franklyn Waltman Jr., the fallout from the Morehead decision would give Roosevelt
“one of the best political breaks” of his Presidential tenure.148 Clearly, as Chambers
notes, Morehead “was one of the most criticized decisions in the history of the
Supreme Court.”149 As Justice Stone noted in a quip directed at Roberts and the Four
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Horsemen, “it is rather amusing to have Republicans and well as Democrats
expressing doubts about the wisdom of the Minimum Wage decision.”150
The tremendous and genuine outrage that followed in the aftermath of
Morehead was not confined to the general public. Chief Justice Hughes was
described by biographer Merlo Pusey as being afraid that Morehead would be a
“self-inflicted wound like the Dred Scott decision.”151
Other Supreme Court colleagues of Roberts, most memorably Justice Stone,
expressed shock at Morehead decision. In writing to Felix Frankfurter a few weeks
before the Morehead decision, Stone commented “I think there has never been a
time in the history of the Court when there has been so little intelligible,
recognizable pattern in its judicial performance as in the last few years.”152 After
Morehead had been decided, Stone wrote to his sister that the Supreme Court had
ended “the most disastrous term in its history.”153
Morehead is not only notable for the unique, bipartisan outcry that it
initiated. Additionally, the opinion penned by Justice Butler seemed to directly
contradict earlier decisions, such as Nebbia (1934), which affirmed a New York
statute that regulated the price of milk. Interestingly enough, this contradiction
would not implicate the Four Horsemen necessarily—after all, they had also
dissented in Nebbia—but rather, would certainly implicate Justice Roberts, who had
voted with the majority in Nebbia, yet ignored its basic principles in Morehead.
Justice Stone would not leave this issue untouched, asserting in his separate dissent
150

Leonard, A Search for a Judicial Philosophy pg. 93
Chambers, “The Big Switch,” pg. 53
152 Solomon, FDR v. The Constitution pg. 82
153 Ibid. pgs. 82-83
151

84
that the Court “should follow our decision in the Nebbia case and leave the selection
and the method of the solution of the problems to which the statute is addressed
where it seems to me the Constitution has left them, to the legislative branch of the
government.”154
According to a variety of scholars of the period, “most” law school journals
and reviewers wholeheartedly agreed with Stone’s portrayal of the Court. Legal
scholars and critics “tore [the Morehead decision] apart,” Chambers writes, “noting
that the Court had previously approved such restrictions on freedom of contract,”
such as “laws limiting the hours of work where long hours would be detrimental to
health.”155 Roberts’s vote in Morehead was irreconcilable with his past positions.
The widespread outrage that followed Morehead would bury any ambitions
of higher office that Roberts harbored. Unlike Alton and Butler, where his
conservative jurisprudence had rallied conservatives and been praised by the
American Liberty League, Morehead forced the opposite conclusion. As Rodell notes,
it was the Morehead decision, the apex of Roberts’s conservatism on the Court,
which “killed his chance for the nomination.”156 The nominating convention was
held only eight days after the Morehead decision had been announced, and the
national opposition that it garnered from every political corner rendered it an
untenable position to take.
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Roberts’s political death in Morehead is no better exemplified by the platform
of the Republican Party adopted at the convention. It read:

“We pledge ourselves to […] support the adoption of State laws and
interstate compacts to abolish sweatshops and child labor, and to protect
women and children with respect to maximum working hours, minimum
wages, and working conditions. We believe that this can be done within the
Constitution as it now stands.”157

The American Liberty League fully supported the Republican Party platform
that was unveiled at the Cleveland nominating convention. Of course, supporting the
Republican platform—which openly advocated for minimum wages laws, working
hour limits, and other labor rights on the state level—put the Liberty League
squarely at odds with Justice Roberts. Wolfskill noted that the Republican platform
“was everything that the Liberty League could have hoped for.” In fact, Wolfskill
goes on to say that “the amazing similarity between the Republican platform […]
and the Liberty League Document [its own election year manifesto] suggested
something more than coincidence.”158
By June of 1936, the national Republican Party and the Liberty League were
nearly identical in membership, makeup, and financiers. Four of the men who
designed the Republican platform belonged to the Liberty League and one third of
the Republican “national finance committee” was composed of Liberty League
157
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members. Most tellingly, John Daniel Hamilton, the chairman of the Republican
National Committee, was quoted as saying “Without Liberty League money, we
couldn’t have had a national headquarters.”159 The American Liberty League, for all
intents and purposes, had been successfully co-opted by the Republican Party. Most
importantly for this research, it demonstrates that Justice Roberts’s vote in
Morehead not only made him a pariah amongst liberals and conservatives across the
country, but made him an outcast in his own party—and the activist organization
that had previously admired him as a “savior of the Constitution.” His presidential
aspirations were rendered a pipe dream.
Roberts had misjudged the political winds. Although the Liberty League had
conducted a focused effort to portray the New Deal as unconstitutional, a vision
helped by Roberts’s votes in Alton, Butler, and now, Morehead, Roberts had
overlooked the power of the establishment figures in the Republican Party.
Although the Liberty League forced a fight on the convention floor over the
inclusion of minimum wage and labor rights planks in the GOP’s platform, this was
only a brief affirmation of Roberts and Morehead. By the end of the convention,
“Landon’s [the 1936 GOP nominee] men had managed to hold their ground on key
questions.”160
This cannot be surprising. After all, the Liberty League was an establishment
organization itself, founded by former presidential candidates and party leaders.
Recognizing that adopting the Morehead principles would be mean likely defeat
against Roosevelt, and cause a suicidal fission in the Republican Party, the leaders of
159
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the Liberty League knew that the protest on the floor of the convention over the
labor rights plank was nothing more than a show. If it were anything more than a
show, the party would be damaged internally and hurt in the eyes of independent
voters nationwide. Thus, it was not the vote in Morehead that killed Roberts’s
candidacy, specifically, but the makeup of the organization that most supported his
candidacy. The establishment nature of the American Liberty League meant that, in
their goal of uniting the GOP and defeating Roosevelt in November, they recognized
that they would have to distant themselves from the Morehead decision. Roberts’s
votes never made him unacceptable to the Liberty League, but it made him
unacceptable in pursuit of defeating Roosevelt in the election, a goal that
necessitated collaboration and compromise with the Republican Party.
This narrative is supported by history. William Lemke, a Republican senator,
launched a third-party bid for the presidency that summer, but his candidacy was
not supported by the American Liberty League or its affiliates. These organizations
were behind the GOP nominee, Alf Landon, not because they agreed with every
single position of his, but rather, because he posed the greatest chance of defeating
Roosevelt.
Moreover, the Liberty League was not as powerful as an organization as it
once had been. Consistent investigations into “lobbying, pressure, and politics” of
the organization by Senator Hugo Black beginning in January 1936 had taken its toll
by the time of the Republican convention.161 Perhaps the League could have pushed
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more vociferously for a Roberts candidacy a few months earlier, but by June of 1936,
they had undergone a “deflation”162 that curtailed its influence.
In November of 1936, the country rendered a decisive decision in favor of
Roosevelt. He won in an absolute landslide, winning all but two states and nabbing
all but eight electoral votes. The country, it appeared, had decided which vision of
the country they preferred.

b. Parrish, the 1936 Election, and Public Opinion
Parrish still remains the final frontier. However, the “devil theory,”163 as
coined by William F. Shughart II in his piece, Bending Before the Storm, provides a
logical and rational reason for Roberts’s vote in Parrish. Without presidential
aspirations tugging at his jurisprudence, Parrish is a return to Roberts’s pre-1934
voting history. Moreover, after the 1936 election, public opinion had crystallized in
full favor of Roosevelt’s New Deal. By 1937, Roberts did not have to worry about
backlash from his Liberty League friends in Parrish— and run the risk of losing the
presidential nomination—but he had to be cognizant of continued backlash against
the bench in the court of public opinion.
The so-called “Ackerman” thesis advances the idea that the Parrish vote was
brought about by the electoral landslide in 1936 that saw Roosevelt win reelection.
This seems to be the case. As Jeff Shesol noted, Roberts was “a man who
cared greatly, perhaps too greatly, about his public reputation.” Roberts was
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described by a reporter as being “too anxious for worldly approval.”164 After failing
to get the nomination—cemented by his broadly criticized vote in Morehead—
Roberts witnessed the country make a decisive and powerful decision in reelecting
President Roosevelt. Suddenly, Roberts was given the chance to redeem his vote in
Morehead, and do so without worrying about presidential pressures from Pierre
DuPont or John W. Davis.
Moreover, the vote in Parrish was also influenced by outside forces that
would have forced Roberts in the same direction, towards the liberal bloc. For one,
Chief Justice Hughes dedicated himself to persuading Roberts to join the liberal
coalition during the summer of 1936. Hughes, an adroit politician in his own right
(Republican nominee for President in 1916) personally visited Roberts and his
wife—after the “Roberts for President boomlet was […] squelched”—at their estate
in Pennsylvania. There is rampant speculation that Hughes pressed Roberts on his
jurisprudence during his 24-hour visit.165
Some speculate the President Roosevelt’s Judicial Reform Procedures Bill of
1937 was the primary influence at the time; however, there are very valid issues
with the “court packing hypothesis.” The most prominent is that Roosevelt did not
announce the court-packing measure until February 5th, six weeks after the Parrish
decision had been voted on. As has been established throughout many accounts of
the time period, Justice Roberts indicated his desire to vote in favor of Washington’s
minimum wage statute, and overturn Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923)
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immediately after oral arguments had concluded on December 17th, 1936.166 In fact,
the record shows that the decision would have been announced much earlier than
March, if not for Chief Justice Hughes. Because Justice Stone was absent at the
hearing in December due to illness, the Chief Justice preferred waiting for Stone to
return, rather than announce a 4-4 decision. The 4-4 decision would have created
the same result, as it would have affirmed the lower courts decision to uphold the
state’s minimum wage statute; however Hughes believed that a 5-4 majority opinion
would provide a much stronger voice than a 4-4 split.167 This sentiment on the part
of Hughes is both rational and understandable given the ire directed at the Court
after the Morehead decision the previous June.
Of course, there is likelihood that Roberts knew of the “court-packing” bill
before it was introduced, given the widespread knowledge inside Washington that
Roosevelt intended to confront the Court if he won reelection in 1936. However,
Hughes was aware that the perception that the Court was intimidated by FDR’s
Court packing plan would dominate any speculation once Parrish was announced. It
was for this reason that Hughes delayed announcing the decision in Parrish even
after Stone returned to the bench in February. According to Marian McKenna,
“Hughes realized that if the justices ruled favorably in Parrish right away, it would
convey the impression that they were bowing to the political threat of courtpacking. Thus they delayed announcing the decision.”168 It seems as if Hughes was
worried that the press and political world would get the wrong idea if Parrish was
166
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announced soon after February 5th, implying that Court-packing was
inconsequential with regards to the Parrish vote. Barry Cushman, in Rethinking the
New Deal, posits that the justices knew that Roosevelt’s Court-packing procedure
had minimal chance of passing, given the likelihood of a Congressional filibuster,
thus further mitigating the chance that the Parrish outcome sought to derail
Roosevelt’s attempt at reconstructing the Supreme Court.169
A more likely scenario—bolstered by the possibility that Roberts’s
considered running for President—is that the 1936 election outcome, and public
opinion more generally, drove Roberts to reconsider his previous vote in Morehead.
The 1936 election, despite some pleas to the contrary, did focus on the issue
of the Supreme Court and the constitutionality of the New Deal. Barry Cushman’s
analysis that Roosevelt did not campaign much at all against the Court is quite
true—as I learned firsthand upon finding nearly no speeches concerning the matter
in Roosevelt’s archives in Hyde Park.
However, that only tells half the story. As shown by Bruce Ackerman, the
Republican Candidate, Alf Landon of Kansas, campaigned constantly and viciously
on the issue of the Supreme Court. Three days before the 1936 election, Landon
hosted a major, final campaign speech at Madison Square Garden in New York. The
focus of his case to the public was, in fact, the Supreme Court:

I come finally to the underlying and fundamental issue of this campaign […]
the President has been responsible for nine acts declared unconstitutional by
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the Supreme Court. He has publicly urged Congress to pass a law, even
though it had reasonable doubts as to its constitutionality. He has publicly
belittled the Supreme Court of the United States […] will he attempt to get
around the Constitution by tampering with the Supreme Court? The answer
is: No one can be sure.170

As Ackerman puts it, “with such questions ringing in their ears, Americans
went to the polls—and gave Roosevelt and the New Deal the greatest victory in
American history.”171
The idea that it was the 1936 election results—along with the absence of any
“presidentitis”—that pushed Justice Roberts to the liberal wing of the Court is
supported by the rest of his votes in the 1936 term. In fact, if the court-packing
scheme was the sole initiator of Justice Roberts’s vote switch it would fail to account
for any reason why Roberts may have continued affirming New Deal measures as
the 1936 term transpired.
To the contrary, theorizing that public opinion and Roosevelt’s sweeping
reelection swayed Justice Roberts would also account for his votes later in the term,
which touched on major New Deal measures. In National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (1937), Roberts provided the decisive vote in a 5-4
ruling that affirmed the constitutionality of the federal Wagner Act.172 In Steward
Machine Co. v Davis (1937), Roberts once again joined with the “Three Musketeers”
170

Ackerman, We the People: Transformations pg. 307
Ibid. pg. 310
172 Cushman, Robert, “Con. Law in 1936-1937,” The American Political Science Review Vol. 32 No.
2 April 1938, pg. 280
171

93
and Chief Justice Hughes to assert the constitutionality of the unemployment
provisions of the Social Security Act by a slim 5-4 margin.173 As Charles Leonard
notes in his qualitative study of all the Court opinions in the first five months of
1937, “the Justices arrived at some very liberal decisions;” the Court ruled in favor
of state regulation at a six percent higher clip than in any of the previous three
years. Most importantly, Justice Roberts dissented in only one case, “making his
record almost a replica of the Court’s line of decisions.”174 Moreover, these liberal
positions are consistent with Roberts’s pre-1934 votes as far as economic cases go.
The outlier, it appears, is the 1934-1936 period.
Finally, in a lecture at Harvard University in 1951, then ex-Justice Roberts
addressed the tension between public opinion and the Supreme Court, saying,
“Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular
urge for uniform standards throughout the country—for what in effect was a unified
economy.”175
There is no greater endorsement of the public opinion hypothesis than
Roberts’s own words. It seems unshakeable, perhaps certain, that Howard
Brubaker’s sarcastic line in the New Yorker, published soon after Parrish, rings true.
“We are told that the Supreme Court’s about face was not due to outside clamor. It
seems that the new building has a soundproof room to which the judges may retire
to change their minds.”176
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However, there is a very important piece of the puzzle that has yet to be
discussed. It must be analyzed for any legitimate theory on “the switch in time” to be
put forth. This would be Justice Roberts’s own explanation of his reasoning behind
the Parrish vote in the 1936 Supreme Court term.

vi. Justice Roberts’s Own Words
a. The Owen Roberts’s Memoranda On West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
In 1955, Felix Frankfurter penned a piece for the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, which was written on the occasion of Roberts’s death. In that tribute,
Frankfurter reveals a document that historians and the press had been seeking since
1937: A memorandum from Roberts explaining his vote in Parrish. In the piece,
Frankfurter explains in a footnote, “Mr. Justice Roberts gave me this memorandum
on November 9, 1945, after he had resigned from the bench. He left the occasion for
using it to my discretion. For reasons indicated in the text, the present seems to me
an appropriate time for making it public.”177
For the parts relevant to this research, the memorandum reads:

"I stated to him [Justice Butler] that I would concur in any opinion which was based
on the fact that the State had not asked us to re-examine or overrule Adkins […] My
proper course would have been to concur specially on the narrow ground I had
taken. I did not do so. I said that I did not propose to review and re-examine the
Adkins case until a case should come to the Court requiring that this should be done
[…] it was that in the appeal in the Parrish case the authority of Adkins was
definitely assailed and the Court was asked to reconsider and overrule it. Thus, for
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the first time, I was confronted with the necessity of facing the soundness of the
Adkins case.”178

The reasoning advanced by Roberts, as seen above, is predicated on the very
technical notion that the counsel for Morehead had never asked the Court to
overturn the Adkins precedent. Justice Roberts admits in the memorandum that
because this was the basis for his ruling against the minimum wage statute, he
should have written a concurring opinion making that clear.
However, the basic premise of the memorandum is far from sound.
Interestingly enough, a bevy of scholars have shed considerable doubt on the idea
that the lawyers in Morehead did not ask the Court to reconsider Adkins. In The New
York Times, lawyers for the State of New York took great issue with the sentiment
that they had somehow not asked for a reconsideration of Adkins. As the Times
reported, “Attorney General John Bennett maintained that […] in the petition to the
Supreme Court for certiorari […] reconsideration of the Adkins case had been
stressed.”179 Moreover, by signing onto Justice Butler’s majority opinion in
Morehead, Roberts accomplished the exact opposite of what he expressed in his
memo—he signed onto an opinion that stated “The Adkins case […] requires
affirmance of the judgment below.”180Instead of seeking to overturn Adkins, as
Roberts’s states was his wish in the Frankfurter memo, he doubled down on it.
Even if Roberts was not aware of the counsel’s desire to see Adkins
overturned, throughout his career he had overturned precedents even when the
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counsel did not explicitly ask him to. Just one year after Morehead, Roberts voted to
overturn precedent in Swift v. Tyson, even though the counsel had “specifically
denied that they were challenging that venerable precedent.”181
Moreover, if Justice Roberts’s did not desire to overturn Adkins, but felt that
the regulation may have been constitutional (as he alluded to in the memorandum
by claiming he should have, in hindsight, written a concurrence), he had the option
of signing onto Chief Justice Hughes opinion, which had voiced those exact concerns.
In his opinion, Hughes distinguished the New York minimum wage law from the law
in question in Adkins, and was thus able to deftly affirm the minimum wage statute
without overruling Adkins.
In fact, Hughes’s opinion was exactly the response that the drafters of the
New York statute had hoped for when the bill was drawn up. Surprisingly, one of the
two chief co-authors of the measure was none other than Felix Frankfurter, who
purposefully drafted the law so that it could withstand a Supreme Court challenge.
Frankfurter was all too aware that the Adkins precedent would be difficult to
overturn, so the New York statute contained “actual differences” that were there “if
Roberts had wanted to recognize them.” As Chambers writes, “Frankfurter and
Cohen had drafted a minimum wage bill designed to express the legal pitfalls
expressed in the Adkins decision.” Sure, these differences were technical, but as
rightly pointed out, “they were no more technical than the point on which Roberts
based his stand,” in Morehead.182 Furthermore, Frankfurter was an expert on these
matters, heavily involved in politics and acted as a close advisor to the President at
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the time; he would be appointed to the Supreme Court a few years thereafter. It
seems quite unlikely that he would make such an amateur error and draw up a bill
that could not be distinguished from Adkins, which, as he well knew, would sound a
death knell for the bill on arrival in the Supreme Court.
Frankfurter’s involvement with the creation of the New York statute brings
his association with the matter into question as well. In fact, some scholars, such as
Michael Ariens, have accused Frankfurter of creating the memo himself as a way to
protect the integrity of the Supreme Court, and defend his old friend Roosevelt.183
Aside from Ariens, it is a legitimate matter to wonder why Roberts would choose
Frankfurter to publish such an important memorandum. For example, after
Roberts’s vote in Parrish Frankfurter scathingly wrote that with “the shift by
Roberts, even a blind man ought to see that the Court is in politics.”184
Understandably, Frankfurter would feel this way; he had explicitly drawn up
a measure that was designed to be distinguishable from Adkins, yet the Court not
only ruled the bill unconstitutional but also declared it undistinguishable from
Adkins. Why Frankfurter would recant his seemingly correct dismay with the
Morehead decision and later agree with Roberts’s technical parsing of the Parrish
vote remains somewhat of a mystery to this day.
Chief Justice Hughes also failed to see any reason why Justice Roberts had
switched his opinion between Morehead and Parrish. In his published
Autobiographical Notes, Hughes resisted speculation that the Court had been
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influenced, in any way, by FDR’s court-packing plan, but then also noted, “The
record shows that Roberts’s change of mind, whatever its cause, came almost three
months before Roosevelt’s court proposal…”185
Chief Justice Hughes’s befuddlement with Roberts’s behavior was mirrored
by the other Justices, most notably by an anonymous Justice who famously
whispered, “What is wrong with Roberts?” upon hearing that Roberts had voted to
overturn Adkins in Parrish. Of course, these are the same people who would be most
inclined to— perhaps not agree, but understand— Roberts’s point of view on the
matter. Clearly, they did not understand his reasoning, and moreover, Roberts did
not take care to clarify his shifting stance.186
For these reasons, there is enough evidence to shed substantial doubt on the
truthfulness to the reasons expressed in Roberts alleged memorandum to Felix
Frankfurter. Either Roberts’s recollection of the incidents taking place in 1936 and
1937 was severely compromised, or he displayed adroit “sophistry rather than
excess legal craftsmanship” in the 1945 letter.187 The oddities surrounding the
contents of Roberts’s memorandum has been widely documented. William
Leuchtenburg, a foremost scholar on the time, would not speculate as to the
authenticity of the letter but noted “Roberts’s contention that he did not switch”
seemed “unpersuasive” to many.188 It seems clear that this sentiment perseveres.
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b. Justice Roberts on Higher Office
Doubts regarding the truthfulness of the Roberts memorandum necessarily
imply that there was a hidden motive behind Roberts’s vote in Morehead. As has
been explored in this paper, it seems that the most thorough explanation for
Morehead rests with the calls for Justice Roberts to run as the Republican candidate
against FDR in 1936. It was a calling made ever the more personal by his close
friends and acquaintances— among them John W. Davis, the Widener family, George
Wharton Pepper, AAPA leaders, boy scout buddy Pierre DuPont, brother in-law
Thomas Gates, and dear friend Sydney Hutchinson—all of whom were closely
associated with an organization hell bent on defeating Roosevelt in 1936 on the very
issue that Roberts knew best: the Constitution of the United States.
After this vision was interrupted by the national and bipartisan outrage to
Morehead and once Roosevelt was reelected in 1936 against a Republican candidate
and Party which explicitly promoted minimum wage laws and certain labor
regulations, Roberts had every reason to finally acquiesce to Chief Justice Hughes,
who had been pushing for Justice Roberts’s vote in Parrish ever since Morehead. He
also had little reason to continue to oppose a President that had won a landslide
reelection and was prepared to fight the Supreme Court tooth and nail. Roberts,
regardless, had always retained a view of the constitution that would allow for
regulations and substantive labor rights as was the case in Nebbia.
However, we have not yet looked at Justice Roberts’s own commentary on
the matter, a testimony that supports this narrative. In 1954, Congress considered
passing an amendment that would have prohibited Supreme Court Justices from
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running for President or Vice-President until five years had passed since he/she
retired from the Court. The Senate, perhaps tellingly, brought Justice Roberts in to
share his views on the matter. More revealing are Justice Roberts’s own words:

I hope that I will be excused from naming names, but it is a matter of
common knowledge that ambition to go from the Court to the Chief Executive
of the Government has hurt the work of a number of men on the Court. Only
once has that occurred […] But the contrary has been true of a number of
Justices, Chief and Associate, of the Supreme Court. They have had in the
back of their minds a possibility that they might get the nomination for
President. Now, that is not a healthy situation because, however strong a
man' s mentality and character, if he has this ambition in his mind it may
tinge or color what he does, […] I happen to have a personal knowledge of
what that pressure is like, for twice ill-advised but enthusiastic friends of
mine urged me to let my name go up as a candidate for President while I was
on the Court. Of course, I turned a hard face on that thing. I never had the
notion in my mind. Men ought not to have the notion in their minds and
ought not to be subject to those pressures.

Roberts’s testimony fully corroborates all the evidence that has been
accumulated in this research. While Roberts does not elaborate on which friends
may have “urged” him to run President, it seems clear enough— given both the
primary press sources and bevy of connections between Roberts and the Liberty
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League—that the anti-New Deal Liberty League was the main proponent of a
Roberts’s candidacy. Perhaps Pierre DuPont had pressed Roberts on a presidential
run at an annual Horseshoe Scout Reservation function at his Longwood Estate, with
promises of secure funding and powerful allies. Perhaps George Wharton Pepper,
whom had guided Roberts since he was at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School, tried to persuade Roberts over a drink in Philadelphia. Perhaps Thomas
Gates, Sydney Hutchinson and John W. Davis advocated the idea at a J.P. Morgan
gathering. What is clear is that these were also not just “ideas” thrown out by
friends. They were serious considerations that could be implemented at a moments
notice, given the League’s incredible organization and funding capabilities.
However, the testimony also sheds considerable doubt on the most
important statement of his testimony; that “of course,” he never considered a
Presidential run. If this was indeed the case, then why did he not, as Lippmann
pleaded him to in 1935, “put to an end once and for all the idea that Justices of the
Supreme Court are available candidates for public office?”189
Lippmann’s reasoning would be logical to Roberts if he had indeed dismissed
any Presidential consideration so abruptly. As Lippmann put it, the notion of a
Roberts’s candidacy would be “certain to cause acute embarrassment to the
Supreme Court as a whole and to Mr. Justice Roberts in particular, especially
because Roberts would continue to sit in judgment upon much of the New Deal.”190
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Lippmann’s assertion is proven true by the test of time. Had Roberts truly not
considered a Presidential candidacy, a simple statement at the time when
speculation was running rampant would have all but quelled the rumors. The theory
put forward by this research would not have been suggested. That Roberts decided
to address these rumors twenty years after the fact only suggests that it had been
tearing inside Roberts for the last two decades, lending further credence to the
notion that the idea of a Roberts presidency was not simply dismissed of
immediately.
More concretely, Justice Roberts would not have to look far and wide to find
an example where a justice effectively and directly shot down rumors of higher
office. Justice Harlan Stone, who served on the Court with Roberts for many years,
was also mentioned as a potential Republican candidate in the 1936 election.
However, Stone took the rational approach that any person who truly did not
entertain the notion of a Presidential campaign would take. As William G. Ross
explains in his essay, Presidential Ambitions, “Stone steadfastly resisted their
encouragement, explaining […] that justices ‘should keep out of politics.’”
Furthermore, according to Ross, “Stone refused even to address the American Bar
Association at its 1935 convention because he feared that his appearance would
stimulate speculation that he would become a candidate.”191 Pearson and Allen’s
observation that Roberts “considered the possibility most seriously,” seems quite
genuine.
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These startling revelations also highlight a potential Freudian slip by Roberts
in the testimony: The idea that the thought of a Presidential candidacy by a Supreme
Court Justice “is not a healthy situation because, however strong a man' s mentality
and character, if he has this ambition in his mind it may tinge or color what he does.”
That logic, it seems, can and should be conveniently applied to Justice Roberts and
his jurisprudence.

vii. After the “Switch”
Soon after Parrish in 1937, Roberts’s status as a deciding swing vote on the
Supreme Court would come to an end. Within a year, two of the “Four Horsemen”—
Van Devanter and Sutherland—would retire, and by 1941 President Roosevelt had
appointed seven new Justices to the Supreme Court, remaking the entire bench.
Roberts’s previous middle-of-the-road jurisprudence soon became viewed as more
conservative, given that his new colleagues were supportive of President Roosevelt
and the New Deal, in general.
Upon his retirement from the bench (as discussed in Part II) Justice Black
refused to sign a letter congratulating Roberts on his years of service; he could not
“subscribe to such a loose interpretation” of Roberts’s jurisprudence, specifically
because “from 1933 to 1937, he seesawed on critical economic New Deal cases.”192
a. Pearl Harbor Commission and the “Dublin Declaration”
However, before retirement, Roberts would not leave the public spotlight
completely. In December 1941, President Roosevelt appointed Roberts to head the
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commission that would investigate the Pearl Harbor attacks. Roberts’s selection,
especially in the context of this thesis, could be viewed as an odd one. After all,
wouldn’t Roosevelt have been wary of a man who had caused him great trouble on
the bench only a few years earlier, and who had been rumored to run against him in
1936?
In fact, this was not the sentiment at all. To the contrary, as journalist John T.
Flynn noted at the time in The Chicago Daily Tribune, the selection of Roberts to
head the commission was a “master stroke” by Roosevelt. According to Flynn,
Roberts had been “screaming for an open declaration of war,” and would be sure to
produce findings that would be pro-intervention in nature.193 Despite any tensions
between the two men, the choice of Roberts was a politically acute maneuver by
Roosevelt that he could not pass up. Roberts was a Republican, which Roosevelt
desired when searching for a candidate, and also had an interventionist philosophy
that would become clear later in life. Republican ideology at the time most closely
aligned with isolationism, so Roberts held a rare combination of two traits that
President Roosevelt sought.
Roberts continued to be involved in foreign policy issues after retiring from
the Supreme Court in 1945. Most surprising was Roberts’s involvement in the socalled “Dublin Declaration,” which was a fifty-member conference held in New
Hampshire. The conference in Dublin—organized and headlined by Roberts—called
for a “world government,” designed to go much further then the United Nations. In
fact, the Dublin Declaration, according to The New York Times, advocated for the
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creation of not only a world federal government, but a “world legislative assembly”
as well, and called the United Nations charter “inadequate” and “behind the
times.”194 The Dublin Declaration was essentially a call for united global governance.
Roberts’s involvement in foreign policy post-Parrish—as the head of the
Pearl Harbor commission and a prominent organizer of the Dublin conference— are
important considerations in the positing of this thesis. In fact, it seems, Roberts’s
activities later in life further support the notion that his votes from 1934-1936—his
major conservative swing on the Court—are categorically out of place when looking
at Roberts’s career in sum. It is hard to reconcile the beliefs of a man who, in the
span of less than one decade, went from advocating rigid conservative notions of
governance, with little room for economic or labor regulations (see Alton and
Butler) to calling for the formation of a world government that would harbor
significant control over sovereign nations.
Sure, these two visions deal with very distinct aspects of public policy, the
domestic economy and foreign policy. But philosophically, it seems that Roberts’s
brief, but defined, conservative pattern from 1934-1936 held influence no longer
than that two-year span. The next year, he would turn on that philosophy in Parrish,
Jones & Laughlin, and Davis, and his foreign policy stances a few years later are
consistent with these later votes, as well as pre-1934 votes in cases such as Nebbia.
The two-year conservative trend is clearly, when looking at Roberts’s career as a
whole, the true outlier. His foreign policy involvement later in life paints the portrait
of a man who believed in the power of central planning and government; in the
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Wilsonian tradition, his views on foreign policy would render him a true, unabashed
progressive.
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V. Conclusion

Trust men and they will be true to you ~ Ralph Waldo Emerson
i. Overview of Findings
Speculation regarding the motive underlying Roberts’s vote in Parrish has
been alive since the day the decision was announced. To some, the “switch” could be
attributed to the court-packing plan and pressure from FDR. Others theorize that it
could be the election of 1936, and the growing public approval of the New Deal.
However, these two hypotheses only account for half of the equation and
consequently only solve half of the problem. Parrish was only surprising because
Justice Owen Roberts underwent a marked and drastic conservative transformation
beginning in the 1934 term, a pattern that came to a halt after the election of 1936
and was highlighted by his vote in Parrish. It is a shift definitively underscored by
the original dataset compiled herein, which narrowed cases from 1931-1937 by
both category and voting margin. The findings of this dataset are reaffirmed by the
more inclusive advanced metrics study undertaken by Ho and Quinn.
This evidence suggests that more attention should be paid to Justice
Roberts’s jurisprudence in the 1934 and 1935 terms. Without these conservative
votes, his decision in Parrish would be only a footnote in the annals of history.
Instead, his conservative trend during these years made the Parrish decision a topic
of scholarly research for the last 75 years.
The one hypothesis that explains more of Justice Roberts’s voting pattern
than any other is that he seriously considered running for President. The evidence
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gathered in this research strengthens this theory, which was previously posited on
the evidence that he was mentioned as a strong contender for the nomination by the
press and other political observers.
However, the uncovered entanglement between Roberts and important
leaders and financiers of the Republican Party and the American Liberty League
lends new and strong favor to this theory. Roberts did not have mere connections;
he had a history of very close relationships with a multitude of these individuals.
These associations span from John W. Davis, leader of the Liberty league, to Pierre
DuPont, a man whom he knew intimately through the Horseshoe Scout Reservation,
to George Wharton Pepper, his mentor since the University of Pennsylvania Law
School and prominent supporter of Liberty League-affiliate Sentinels of the
Republic. The list continues with Edward T. Stotesbury, father in-law of lifelong
friend Sydney Hutchinson and major financier of Liberty League umbrella
organizations (especially Wharton Pepper’s Sentinels), to the Widener family, whom
helped vault Roberts to prominence, to Thomas Gates, his brother-in law and
partner at J.P. Morgan, to George Wickersham, fellow executive board member of
the American Law Institute, to Atwater Kent, another man heavily involved in the
Horseshoe Scout Reservation’s executive body who become a supporter of the
Sentinels as well.
There was a common cause underneath these connections that had
previously proven successful. Roberts was a public champion of the anti-Prohibition
cause; this was the same cause that the AAPA, directed by his current law firm
founder and partner, used to become the foremost anti-Prohibition organization in
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the land. The AAPA then transformed, post a victorious Prohibition repeal, into the
American Liberty League, the same organization with a different name.
Roberts admitted in Senate testimony that “two friends” of his had, on
several occasions, urged him to run for President. We can now take a strong guess
as to which “friends” he was referring to.
In his testimony, Roberts also made sure to note that he dismissed these
suggestions immediately. However, actions speak louder than words. Instead of
publicly dismissing these presidential ambitions, as his colleague Justice Stone had,
Roberts took the confounding route of keeping silent, which only served to spark,
not quell, speculation of a Roberts candidacy. His remarkable about-face in Parrish
came, not surprisingly, once his prospective candidacy was extinguished and
Roosevelt had been reelected by historical margins.

ii. Implications of this Thesis
The simple, yet consequential question thus only remains: Did these personal
influences and ambitious desires actually cause Justice Roberts’s to vote
conservatively from 1935-1936?

It seems that now, more than ever, the answer to that question may be yes.

There is a substantial chance that Roberts always had the notion in the back
of his mind, enough so that he would not dismiss it forthrightly. For a swing voter
such as Justice Roberts, this idea alive in the back of his mind would be more than
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enough to make him tack conservatively when was on the fence. It strains credulity
to think that all of his friends and acquaintances affiliated with the Liberty League
did not vociferously push Roberts to pursue an anti New Deal agenda. Perhaps these
persuasions were paired with the promise that, if possible, the League would unite
behind Roberts at the Republican convention in June. After all, Pierre DuPont and
E.T. Stotesbury did not contribute massive sums of money to the Liberty League for
it to be inconsequential in the 1936 election. What greater impact could the League
have than fielding a candidate who was a source of authority on the issue that
mattered to them most, the Constitution? And what better choice than DuPont’s Boy
Scout colleague, Wharton Pepper’s mentee, and Thomas Gates’s brother-in-law,
Owen Roberts?
Many of the Liberty League’s leaders, such as John W. Davis and Al Smith,
were initially supporters of President Roosevelt, but formed the Liberty League
because he had violated their trust and values. Owen Roberts represented the
opposite. He was a man they could trust; many of them had known him for a long
period of time. He had fought with them against Prohibition, and was fighting with
them against the New Deal from the Supreme Court.
Roberts followed a conservative jurisprudence, very much aware of the
strong possibility that his political allies would return the favor at the Republican
Convention. However, Roberts crucially mis-stepped with Morehead. Although the
ruling was not anathema to the Liberty League, it was to the Republican Party. More
importantly, it was a decision that could not be supported if the Liberty League and
GOP had any hope in the November election.
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This was the one goal above all else, and the establishment figures that led
the Liberty League knew it. Nominating Roberts was no longer a possibility.
This once-burning presidential desire caused Roberts a great deal of stress
when, after the election had concluded, he knew that he disagreed with the tenets of
Adkins and Morehead, and thus voted to overturn them in Parrish. His ambition
extinguished, he could no longer ignore growing public opinion favoring the New
Deal. His rightward drift on the Court was a period in his life that he was so ashamed
of that he would take it with him to his grave—quite literally. Frankfurter would
not publish the memo until after Roberts’s death, a fact that seems too coincidental
given the circumstance.
He only desired to confront the questions surrounding the confusing votes of
Morehead and Parrish once he was no longer around to face the inevitable scrutiny,
and perhaps, the truth.

iii. Final Considerations
The conclusion of this research is thrice folded. One, Justice Roberts
underwent not one switch, but two. First, he moved to the right on matters of
economic regulation and labor rights during the latter half of the 1934 term.
Secondly, he switched again in the 1936 term, starting with Parrish, and
sided with the liberal coalition on the same category of issues. The vote in Parrish
marked a return to his pre-1934 decisions such as Nebbia.
Third, and finally, the reason why Justice Roberts “seesawed” between these
two coalitions had to do with the fact that he considered, for a few months between
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1935 and 1936, the prospect of running for President. He entertained the notion—
which was a very real one— just enough that it swayed his middle-of-the-road
jurisprudence.
Scholars of the time period, whom I spoke with personally, such as Jeff
Shesol, Laura Kalman, and William G. Ross, find that the thesis herein is an
intriguing and plausible one. They all correctly note that there is no “smoking gun,”
which leaves the argument as intriguing rather than irrefutable.
However, there will never be a “smoking gun” with regards to the “switch in
time that saved nine,” unless a document is recovered from Roberts’s attic that
reveals his true intentions.
Moreover, there is no ‘smoking gun’ to the Court-packing hypothesis; there is
no smoking gun to the public-opinion theory; there is no smoking gun to the
Internalist argument. The thesis posited here falls in line with the above. Thus, those
involved in the study of “the switch in time” can only hope to continue building a
constructive narrative that continues to clarify the confounding story and fill in the
gaps.
I am of the opinion that Justice Roberts’s votes in Morehead and Parrish
derived from a desire to run for president in 1936. I cannot ignore the conclusions
reached from the dataset. The evidence gathered uncovers close connection after
close connection between Roberts and the American Liberty League. Together, these
two original findings support one another.
The “switch in time that saved nine” has heretofore been remanded for
further hearings.
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Appendix A: Dataset Cases
Case
#
282
U.S.
251
283
U.S.
35
283
U.S.
249
283
U.S.
380
283
U.S.
527
284
U.S.
80
284
U.S.
248
285
U.S.
22
285
U.S.
234
285
U.S.
393
286
U.S.
210
286
U.S.
352
286
U.S.
472
287
U.S.
251
287
U.S.
283

Issue

Roberts's Vote

Dissent

Roberts's
Position

NJ regulation of
insurance
commission

With majority,
upholding law

Four Horseman

Liberal

ICC Regulation

Pro-ICC

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

State regulation of
railroads brakes

Uphold
regulation

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Pro state

McReynolds

Liberal

Pro state

Four Horseman

Liberal

ICC regulatory rules

Against state

Stone, Holmes,
Brandeis

Conservative

ICC maximum rates
via due process
Substantive due
process in
compensation

Against
ICC/state

N/A- Unanimous

Conservative

Pro-worker and
state

Roberts, Brandeis,
Stone

Liberal

Pro-state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Mandating Public
Utilities
Mandate state
licensing of any
business

Massachussetts
workmen comp.
Oklahoma Oil
Taxation rights
OK law regulating
production of
petroleum

Pro state

Roberts, Stone,
Brandeis, Cardozo

Liberal

Anti
regulation/state

N/A- Unanimous

Conservative

Motor Vehicle Act of
Kansas

Pro-state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Pro-tax/state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Pro regulation

Butler
Unanimous w/
Stone & Cardozo
concurrence

Liberal

South Carolina Gas
Tax
TX regulation of
truck driver
licensing
ND law allowing
consumer item
return

Pro state

Liberal

114
288
U.S.
14
288
U.S.
517
290
U.S.
326
290
U.S.
398
290
U.S.
570
291
U.S.
300
291
U.S.
352
291
U.S.
502
291
U.S.
619
292
U.S.
263
293
U.S.
163
293
U.S.
194
293
U.S.
388
294
U.S.
169
294
U.S.
240
294
U.S.
384
294
U.S.
405
294

ICC mandate to
build more tracks

Anti
ICC/regulation

Stone, Brandeis,
Cardozo

FL requiring state
licensing of business
S.C. regulation of
banks

Anti
state/regulation
Pro state law
(against
regulation)

Stone, Brandeis,
Cardozo
Roberts,
Sutherland, Butler,
McReynolds

Emergency Relief
Act of Minnesota

Pro state

Four Horseman

Liberal

Nebraska regulation
of bread sales

Pro state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Conservative

Conservative

Liberal

Washington tax on
different businesses
Mississippi law
protecting
contractors

Pro state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Pro state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

NY law regulating
price of milk

Pro state

Liberal

Seattle municipal
tax

Pro tax/state

Four Horseman
Unanimous w/ Four
Horseman
concurrence

NH tax on peddlers

Pro state

NY law regulating
milk sales

Pro state

NY milk law

Liberal

Anti state

N/A- Unanimous
Unanimous w/
Sutherland
concurrence
Unanimous w/
Stone & Cardozo
concurrence

Liberal

Conservative

Presidential
Authority in NIRA

Anti state

Cardozo

Conservative

PA liquid/fuel tax

Pro tax/state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

U.S. anti-gold law

Pro
state/regulation

Four Horseman

Liberal

Montana business
licensing taxes

Anti tax/state

N/A- Unanimous

Conservative

Tennessee Highway
Regulation
NY milk law in

Anti state
Anti state

Stone, Cardozo
N/A- Unanimous

Conservative
Conservative

Liberal
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U.S.
514
294
U.S.
550
294
U.S.
608
295
U.S.
76
295
U.S.
89
295
U.S.
165
295
U.S.
285
295
U.S.
330
295
U.S.
495
296
U.S.
176
296
U.S.
315
296
U.S.
404
297
U.S.
1
297
U.S.
135
297
U.S.
189
297
U.S.
251
297
U.S.
266
297
U.S.

interstate commerce

Kentucky Gross
sales tax

Anti tax/state

Stone, Brandeis,
Cardozo

Conservative

Oregon Dentist
Regulations

Pro state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Pro state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Pro state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

GA city imposing tax
on paving streets

Anti tax/state

Stone, Brandeis,
Cardozo

Conservative

GA Motor Carrier Act

Pro state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Railroad Retirement
Act

Anti state

Maine law regulating
carriers
NY violating of
compensation in
Motor Vehicle Act

Anti state

Hughes, Cardozo,
Brandeis, Stone
Unanimous w/
Stone & Cardozo
concurrence

Conservative

Pro state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Homeowners loan
act regarding states

Anti state

N/A- Unanimous

Conservative

Vermont business
tax

Anti state

Stone, Brandeis,
Cardozo

Conservative

Agricultural
Adjustment Act

Anti state

Stone, Brandeis,
Cardozo

Conservative

ND 'excessive' tax

Anti tax/state

Stone, Brandeis,
Cardozo

Conservative

Anti state

N/A- Unanimous

Conservative

Pro state

Four Horseman

Liberal

Anti
state/regulation

Stone, Brandeis,
Cardozo
Unanimous w/
Roberts, 4 others

Constitutionality of
NIRA
Dept of Agriculture
packaging
regulations

LA law changing
right of associations
NY Milk control law,
14th amendment
due process
NY milk licensing
law
Fed Gov't
contracting rights

Pro state

Conservative

Conservative
Liberal

116
288
297
U.S.
422
298
U.S.
1
298
U.S.
238
298
U.S.
349
298
U.S.
587
299
U.S.
33
299
U.S.
183
299
U.S.
387
300
U.S.
379

concurring
CA 'Fish & Game'
regulations
Securities and
Exchange
Commission
regulation

Pro state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Anti
regulation/state

Stone, Brandeis,
Cardozo

Conservative

Coal Conservation
Act

Anti state

Railroad
Commission Rules

Pro state

Stone, Brandeis,
Cardozo
Unanimous w/
Stone, Cardozo,
Brandeis Roberts
concurring

NY Minimum wage
law

Anti
regulation/state

Hughes, Cardozo,
Brandeis, Stone

Conservative

TX tax on
production of oil

Pro tax/state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Pro state

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Pro
state/regulation

N/A- Unanimous

Liberal

Pro state

Four Horseman

Liberal

Fair Trade Act of
Illinois
Truckdriver
regulation
ordinance, Illinois

Parrish

Conservative

Liberal
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